

The MI Schoolhouse



A French officer instructs at the Signal Corps Photographic School in Ithaca, New York, in 1917.



An officers' intelligence course in May 1918, which included American, British, Australian, and New Zealand officers.



The Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, in World War II.



Signal intelligence training took place at West Hill Farms, Virginia, until 1949.



The staff and faculty of the Intelligence School at Fort Riley, Kansas, in April 1946.



A map-reading class at the Army Intelligence School in Austria.



Alvarado Hall was Huachuca's first facility built specifically for intelligence training in 1953.



In 1955 the CIC School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, became the Army Intelligence School.



The U. S. Army Intelligence School relocated to Fort Huachuca in 1971, taking over temporary World War II buildings.



By 1994, all classes that were formerly taught at Fort Devens, Mass., are consolidated at Fort Huachuca.



In February 1994, Nicholson Hall, part of the new \$86 million academic complex, was dedicated at Huachuca's Intelligence Center.

Formal training in the Military Intelligence art did not begin in the U.S. Army until World War I when intelligence specialists were hurriedly taught at British and French schools. Since that time, Army intelligence training schools have been fragmented, far-flung, and ad hoc field expedients. It was not until 1993 that all Army intelligence training was unified at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Pictured here are just some of the intelligence educational institutions of the past century.

A Brief History of U.S. Army Intelligence Training



This photograph shows those attending a military intelligence course in May 1918. The course was held at Harrow School and included 6 Americans, 1 Australian, 1 New Zealander, and 3 Royal Air Force officers in addition to those from the British Army. The Americans are the only ones wearing the high choker collar. The glass negative was found in the school photographer's shop in 1985. Presented by Brig. Gen. M.P. Ford, Director British Intelligence Corps, in June 1986.

The history of military intelligence began somewhere around the time that warfare began. But training in the intelligence art was largely a 20th century experience, made imperative by the proliferation of science and technology within military science generally. The early history of Military Intelligence training within the U.S. Army was fragmented and incomplete because the training itself was on-the-job, ad hoc and most often non-existent.

Early History

Colonel Arthur L. Wagner is remembered for his contributions as an advocate of Army educational reform, professionalism, and a writer of considerable influence on military organization and tactics. But he also holds another distinction. He wrote the first U.S. Army textbook that dealt extensively with military intelligence. In 1893 he published *The Service of Security and Information*, a pivotal work calling attention to the importance of intelligence-gathering to the American military leader.



Arthur Wagner L.

Wagner was a believer in the power of history to educate. His approach was didactic and he was convinced that “the experience of the past” could form “guide for the future.” He said, “If an officer would prepare himself to be of service

to his country, he must attentively consider the recorded experience of those who have learned war from the actual reality, and must accumulate by reading and reflection a fund of military knowledge based upon the experience of others.”

To those who opposed his reforms as “mere theory,” and there were many, he shot back, “There are officers who pose as practical soldiers, and affect to despise all theory. These...are generally ignorant and obstinate men who know as little of the practice as they do the theory of war.... How can we be sure that they will not some day find themselves compromised on service from want of knowledge, not from want of talent?” He viewed the obstructionists as the “Ireland Army,” an unkind reference to the immigrant soldiers who won their commissions on the Civil War battlefields.¹

As chief of MID from 1896-98, and as an intelligence officer at-large during the Spanish-American War, he sought to impress the importance of MI on an indifferent Army leadership. If he failed to win over his superiors [Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter thought his Bureau of Military Information was intended to spy on him rather than report on the enemy], he did make an impact on at least one of his subordinates. Twenty years later Ralph Van Deman, then a lieutenant, now a major, picked up the MI banner and carried it forward. It was largely through Van Deman’s persistent pleadings that a Military Intelligence Division emerged in 1917 and served the U.S. Army well throughout the war in Europe.

One of the early training efforts was the formation in 1917 of the first aerial photography school at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. One of its first graduates and instructors was 2d Lieutenant George Goddard who pioneered many of the advances in aerial reconnaissance, experimenting with infrared photography, and long-focal length camera lenses. His first job at the new school was to build it. The forty people in the first class were put to work with hammers and saws building the photo labs and dark rooms in Schoellkopf Hall. Using French and British instructors who were familiar with the terrain in the European theater, the course was designed to turn out officers who would command aerial

photographic sections so critically needed in France. Every two weeks large shipments of actual photos taken along the front arrived at Ithaca. Goddard gave a picture of one of the teaching methods at the school.

An up-to-date map of the entire battlefield from the English Channel to the Swiss border was located on a long, high wall in the classroom. The map showed in great detail the first, second, and third German trench systems, no-man's land and the first, second and third English, American and French trench systems. Each day the students would interpret the various pictures with the assistance of the French and British instructors who were familiar with the particular areas along the battle lines. The students would then revise the map and bring it up to date.²

The American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I relied upon its allies for intelligence training, and Americans assigned to intelligence duties like interrogation or creating aerial photo mosaics went to the British Army Intelligence School at Harrow, England. The Americans eventually established their own intelligence school at Langres, France.

Colonel Ralph Van Deman, a believer in intelligence training, organized the first training element, MI-9, as part of his Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, in the summer of 1918. He also recommended that a training facility modeled on the Langres school be set up in the Washington, D.C., area.

In October 1918 the MID published the first Army-wide intelligence training literature titled *Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual*. It was meant for training combat intelligence groups at the infantry division, regimental and battalion levels, after soldiers had received their uniform initial training in Division Intelligence Schools of Application in the United States. This forerunner of the 1940 Field Manual 30 series was also a training supplement to *Intelligence Regulations, A.E.F. 1917*, and other AEF intelligence instructions. It recognized that "originality, inventiveness and adaptability are essential to success in intelligence work," and therefore recommended that the manual be used as a general guide.³



A French officer teaches the principles of aerial photography at Ithaca, New York.

Before 1918, there was no technical training for intelligence officers. The American Expeditionary Force in France recognized this deficiency and cabled the War Department to ask that intelligence officers be sent to France ahead of their division's sailing date so that they could attend a special intelligence training course. Initially, the course consisted of a quick visit to the front lines, then enrollment at the AEF General Staff College in Langres, France.

The U.S. Army Intelligence School at Langres began its operation on July 25, 1918, with Major Thomas Carton as director. Its faculty was international in flavor, with one British and two French officers on the staff. With about 11 instructors in all, they taught two six-week classes and one eight-week class, averaging 46 students each, for 46.5 hours a week, Monday through Saturday, and sometimes Sunday. The demand for enrollment far exceeded the number of spaces available because of the demand in the field for trained intelligence officers.

Dennis E. Nolan described in his final report the three main courses of instruction:

1. The detailed study of the enemy army, its organization, recruiting system, strength and location of its units and all matters that would help an Intelligence officer to visualize the enemy's forces.
2. The examination of prisoners and documents. Theoretically, by means of books and lectures; and practically, by means of the actual examination of enemy prisoners and documents.

3. Topography, including the study, interpretation and restitution of airplane photographs.

To give the students a rounded though admittedly superficial grounding in military basics, they were also taught about American and allied organization and tactics.

A student could find himself interrogating actual fresh German prisoners, pouring over real captured documents from the front, or studying the German Order of Battle from the Spring Offensive just completed. His school day lasted from 0900 to 2100 hours, with time out for lunch and dinner. On Saturday or Sunday, he could hear a guest lecturer expound on such subjects as "The Austro-Hungarian Army," "Tanks and Tank Tactics," "German Gas Warfare," or "Scouting, Patrolling and Trench Raids."⁴

This system had the disadvantage of taking the officer out of his division for an average of three months and thereby depriving him of the training and staff work he would have received at the division level.

In an article he wrote after the war for a history teachers' magazine, former Capt. John C. Parish explained the training he got at Langres prior to taking up duties in the G2 shop of the First Army, A.E.F.:



Students learn about photo mosaics during World War I field training.

Late in July, 1918, about fifty officers gath-

ered at the high-walled and historic French town of Langres for six weeks of intensive study. The group had been drawn widely from the American Expeditionary Forces. Some men had been called back from the front line in Northern France and Belgium, the mud of the trenches still on their boots; some had come from less active sectors in the Vosges region; others were from more recently arrived divisions still undergoing training in the areas back of the lines.

The instructors were American, British and French officers experienced in the recent operations, and the term comprised six weeks of the most concentrated training. Examinations were frequent and casualties often occurred. The amount of information one had to acquire in that brief time seemed appalling. It was necessary to learn all about the German Army—the organization of staff and line, the details of recruiting, and the stages and classes of service from that of the young boy entering active service to that of the comparatively old man in the landsturm, the grades of officers and men, the numbers and arrangements of units of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, foot artillery and mountain artillery, the composition of machine gun organizations, jager battalions, engineers and pioneer groups. The officers diligently learned the origin of every one of the several hundred German divisions. They studied the expansion and reformation of the German Army during the war, and tried to memorize the details of their equipment and uniform, their artillery weapons, shells, fuses, gas projectors and a hundred other details.

Aside from the German Army it was necessary to learn to interpret airplane photographs, to use military maps with readiness, to gain familiarity with the theatre of operations, and to learn the routine of intelligence work in regiments, divisions and higher echelons.

Those who were studying for the interrogation of prisoners had the opportunity of practice by catechising groups of actual German prisoners brought back from the front. These interrogations were carried out against

time and were excellent training.⁵

The forerunner of the Counterintelligence Corps, the Corps of Intelligence Police, was created in August 1917 to meet a need of the AEF for investigators with linguistic abilities. They would be tasked with protecting the AEF from enemy espionage activities. The training for the first 50 sergeants, many of them European born, began in France under the tutelage of Commandant Walter of the French Surete. It was an educational experience for all concerned, especially for the several members of the corps who were discovered to be French draft dodgers by their French police instructor and thrown in jail. After that initial screening and thinning of their ranks,

dashes with the turn of their head.

There was little effort within the War Department to provide any training beyond the unit level, and that training mainly concerned basic counterintelligence. To rectify that situation, Colonel F. L. Dengler was returned from France to establish MI-9, the training section of the Military Intelligence Division, and to coordinate training matters with the AEF G-2. He arranged to have combat experienced veterans sent home from Europe to act as instructors in divisions slated for shipment overseas. MID's creation of its own training section soon ran afoul of War Department turf-guarding, with the War Plans Division



ten CIP agents were picked to train with the British at Le Havre. A *Syllabus for Instruction of Intelligence Police* was prepared by a British officer which included subjects like "Recognition of the boundary between Military Police and Intelligence Police work" and "the use of tact in dealing with French officials." About 75 men completed the four- to six-week coursework, as the CIP grew in numbers, and plans were underway in mid-1918 to open a four-week Intelligence School at Bourdeaux. It never materialized, however, and on-the-job training at Bourdeaux had to suffice for most of the CIP men. The British course at Le Havre was the only formal instruction available until the end of the war, and it was considered indispensable.⁶

Army students attending cryptology classes at Riverbank Labs near Chicago pose for their graduation picture, spelling out "Knowledge is power" in Morse code by simulating dots and

objecting that training fell within its boundaries alone. MID should not be conducting its own training program.

To solve this dispute, Colonel Dengler was transferred to the Training Branch of the War Plans Division where he would continue to work out the training for "positive intelligence personnel," and still be responsive to MID requirements.

A few years after the Armistice, Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, now called the Assistant Chief of Staff, Director of Military Intelligence, General Staff, was arguing for the continuance of MI training so that the lessons of the war not be lost. He observed in April 1920 that, "The doctrine and practice of combat intelligence training was evolved in the A.E.F. It is being continued at the present moment in the intelligence course at the General Staff College under Brigadier General D. E. Nolan, in the Service Schools at Leavenworth under Colonel W. Howell, and by the G-2s of tactical units. It is believed that the

proper way to make sure that no useful lessons of the war are lost is to have the general policy concerning intelligence training announced by the Training and Instruction Branch, War Plans Division, after consultation with the Military Intelligence Division, which should be held responsible that nothing is lost that stood the test of actual war in the A.E.F.”⁷

In the postwar Army, intelligence training was to take place in the field rather than at any centralized school, with special courses being offered at the service schools and in the General Staff College. Churchill described the status of U.S. Army intelligence training in early 1920:

Combat Intelligence and Combat Intelligence Training has been provided for by the creation of the Troop Subsection of the MI5, issue of the Provisional Intelligence Regulations of the A.E.F., and by the detail of department and division intelligence officers who have had G-2 training in France. Division and Department Commanders are charged with the instruction of their commands. The principle of decentralization demands that the War Department give them a free hand in intelligence training which they, more than anyone in Washington, are competent to initiate and to develop.

The intelligence courses at the Service Schools and at the General Staff College are in charge of officers who distinguished themselves in intelligence work in the A.E.F. M.I.D. furnishes them with data and assistance. This is believed to constitute the proper relationship.⁸

His successor in the job of top MI officer in the Army kept up the drumbeat for peacetime MI training. Major General Dennis E. Nolan, Pershing’s G2 in France during the war and now, in 1921, the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, voiced his concern that training for military intelligence would again be ignored, as it was before the war. He wrote, “My fear is that in the pressure of many things, claiming time for training, our Army may lapse into the pre-war days in its attitude toward the whole question of combat intelligence and that information regarding the enemy for our tactical problems and in our maneuvers will be based on

the old and easy assumption that all information needed of the enemy is obtained from an enemy inhabitant.”⁹

Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney played an important part in setting up the Military Intelligence Division of General John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force headquarters in 1917. He served with that headquarters until July 1918 when he joined the V Corps and 28th Infantry Division in the fighting. Before the war, the experienced infantry officer had been active in training officers. Wanting to capture the lessons of his World War I experience, he wrote a book about the emerging importance of military intelligence to further the understanding of that craft and its usefulness to commanders. In *Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War*, published in 1924, he concluded:

One of the most important lessons gained...was that a great loss of efficiency in the military machine was caused by failure to maintain good team play between commanders and their staffs and between members of the same staff. Some officers, who saw more Intelligence staff work than any other kind, have gained the impression that this was particularly true with regard to the relation of Intelligence officers to their commanders and to their coordinate brother staff officers. ...The natural consequence...was...a higher price in human life.¹⁰

As a former trainer, he had much to say about the training that would be required for intelligence officers at the various levels of command. At the General Staff level, he called for all staff officers to be trained in intelligence so that they could be familiar with the matters normally handled by the Acofs, G2, and so that they would be able to “make a critical analysis of the situation, plans and intentions of the enemy.”

For Intelligence Service personnel, he thought the instruction should be “uniform in its nature and cover a definite specified field.” Although specialized training was a necessity, a certain amount of cross-training was desirable. All the intelligence specialists “must all talk the same language or there will be lost motion and wasted effort.”

Recognizing that the intelligence skills needed

in time of war would have to come from a pool of experts that were trained in peacetime or that were able to convert civilian skills, he turned to the Reserve and National Guard as a source of intelligence manpower during periods of crisis. Parallels for this element of his thinking can be found in the modern-day dependence on reserve forces for such experts as linguists.

He called for “ingenuity and care in preparing the course of study.” His experience told him that the best method for training intelligence personnel was what he called “the applicatory system of instruction.” This hands-on approach would require the student to “actually solve his problem or make his report, as he would under service conditions, in accordance with the assumed situation given him in the problem.”

In promulgating these ideas, he was undertaking a futile attempt to formalize doctrinal, organizational, and training tenets for military intelligence in the post World War I U.S. Army. That he did not succeed is not surprising in a military establishment that shrank to negligible levels in the interwar years. That he recognized the essential nature of military intelligence, that is its importance to commanders and organizations is revealing in that he foresaw the U.S. Army doctrine of the 1990s, encapsulated in the phrase “Commanders Drive Intelligence.”

Despite some training successes in World War I and the advocacy of men like Van Deman, Dengler, Churchill, Nolan and Sweeney, the post-war intelligence training was inhibited by the lack of funds and personnel across the Army as a whole. The hopes of MID leaders to establish their own MI Training School after the war were dashed by the drastic drawdown in manpower and budget allocations.

The clash over training responsibilities lingered after the war and into the next decade. MID organized a Training Section (MI-4) again in February 1922 which attempted to supervise and standardize combat intelligence training and conduct a Military Intelligence Reserve Officers (MIORC) correspondence course. With two officers and two civilian clerks, it was to expand on the work of the former Troop Subsection of MI 5 which had been set up in early 1920. The chief of the new training section had to report after its first

fiscal year of operation that “nothing in the way of supervision of combat intelligence training in the Army has been accomplished.”¹¹ But the MI 4 soon began to make headway, recommending that local intelligence schools that were to be organized in the event of mobilization in each Corps Area and Departmental command adopt a standard training outline published by MI 4, a recommendation that most adopted.

In 1924 they published the first *Combat Intelligence Regulations*, and were working on *Tactical Interpretation of Aerial Photographs*, and a *Correspondence Course for MI-ORC Officers*.

The ACofS, G2, War Department General Staff, Col. James H. Reeves, was worried that insufficient attention was being paid by field commanders to military intelligence training and in his annual reports for FY 1925 and 1926 he called for a larger G2 role in writing training regulations and conducting tactical inspections. Those functions, however, would remain firmly in G3. That was the state of affairs in 1931 when one MID staffer wrote, “The state and extent of combat intelligence training in the Army is not known to this branch; as it makes no inspections and receives no training reports.”¹²

Meanwhile, the Army Air Corps was conducting its own training in aerial photography. In 1929 George Goddard reported to Chanute Field, Rantoul, Illinois, to be Director of the School of Photography, Air Corps Technical Command. He described the curriculum.

The course for enlisted students covered a varied curriculum of subjects ranging from mathematics to mosaic making. (The basic photographic course included mathematics involved in photography, the principles of photography, negative making processes, lantern slide making, photographic optics, cameras, practical ground photography, newspaper and commercial photography, copying, filters, the work of the field photographic section and mosaic making.) There was also a nine-month course for a class of officers. Their curriculum was basically the same as that of the enlisted men, but in addition, they studied practical aerial photography, the military use of photographs, photographic interpretation, and aerial intelligence. In-

cluded were approximately 150 hours of air time divided equally between piloting and acting as the photographic observer.

In the training of officers to become photographic pilots and observers, the utmost care was taken in selecting men who had an aptitude for navigation, engineering and endurance flying—rather than the spectacular fighter or attack types. Bomber and transport pilots generally made good photographic aviators, particularly for mapping operations. With our limited number of navigation instruments, it required months of practice and study to become a good photographic pilot.

* * *

Since some of the officer trainees would go on to command photo sections and, both officers and enlisted men alike were required to be proficient in the demanding work involved in every aspect of aerial photography, I stressed innovation in all training. Resourcefulness became the watchword of the school.

For example, in the dead of winter a group of students would be dumped out beside a frozen river. They would have portable laboratory equipment with them. At some point in the next twenty-four hours a plane would fly over and drop rolls of exposed film. Processing the film required cutting a hole in the ice to get fresh water. When the film was developed it was sent back to base by motorcycle. During the exercise the men not only worked under difficult climatic conditions, they also lived under them.¹³

In his book on *Combat Intelligence*, an instructor at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in the 1930s tells us that the U.S. Army doctrine prior to 1932 was based upon determining the “enemy’s probable intentions.” At the Command and General Staff School the doctrine was modified to present the commander with only hypotheses based upon capabilities alone, thus complicating the process, but eliminating guesswork.¹⁴ The 1951 field manual on *Combat Intelligence* echoed the 1932 thinking when it cautioned commanders to “be certain they base their actions, dispositions and plans upon estimates of enemy capabilities rather than upon

estimates of enemy intentions.” The 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, revised Army doctrine to its pre-1932 stance, advising that “enemy intentions must be considered along with capabilities and probable actions,” realizing that capabilities and intentions are mutually compelling.

In 1933 the Military Intelligence Division was busy revamping its extension courses for MI reserve officers. By October of that year they reported that they had revised four courses [Command Staff Functions, Military Intelligence Organization and Functions, Intelligence Documents, and Military Maps] and were working on three more updated courses [Combat Intelligence; Collection, Evaluation and Dissemination of Combat Intelligence; and Map Compilation and Reproduction].

According to the historian of the MID, Bruce Bidwell, the intelligence training activities reached a new low in 1934, when the four officers of the Training Section of the Operations Branch “were chiefly engaged in performing functions connected with mobilization plans, intelligence police, reserve affairs and the domestic subversive situation, rather than those related directly to establishing intelligence training policies or procedures.”¹⁵ Training funds were so scarce that only 17 MI reserve officers could be called up for training in all of the Corps Areas in FY 1934. This situation could only improve in FY 1935.

In 1938 a basic field manual for intelligence was envisioned and its three sections were in final draft. They were: Part One—“Combat Intelligence” (to replace TR 210-5); Part Two—“Tactical Interpretation of Aerial Photographs” (to replace TR 210-10); and Part Three—“Examination of Prisoners, Deserters, Inhabitants, Repatriates, Documents and Material.”

Also in 1938 exams were written to test the language capabilities of MI Reserve officers speaking Dutch, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish or Swedish. A year later the Regular Army started a “certified language officer list.”

The Military Intelligence Division issued the first field manuals to be known as the FM-30 series beginning in 1940. They included: FM 30-5 *Combat Intelligence* (17 April 1940); FM 30-10 *Observation* (30 November 1940); FM 30-15

Examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Documents and Materials (22 July 1940); FM 30-20 *Military Maps* (27 May 1940); FM 30-21 *Role of Aerial Photography* (1 November 1940); FM 30-25 *Counterintelligence* (15 February 1940); FM 30-30 *Identification of United States Government Aircraft* (18 September 1940); FM 30-31 *Identification of British Aircraft* (limited edition, 2 December 1940); FM 30-35 *Identification of German Aircraft* (5 July 1940); FM 30-38 *Identification of Japanese Aircraft* (25 June 1940); FM 30-40 *Identification of United States Armored Vehicles* (21 May 1941); FM 30-41 *Identification of British Armored Vehicles, German, Japanese, Russian, Italian, and French* (20 June 1941); FM 30-50 *Identification of United States Naval Vessels* (11 October 1941); and FM 30-55 *Identification of German Naval Ships* (19 June 1941).

Turning to signals intelligence, all SIGINT intelligence training accomplished in the years before World War II was done by the Army Signal Corps' Signal Intelligence Service which had been founded in 1930 to handle all cryptologic functions for the Army. Under the leadership of William F. Friedman, the SIS published studies on cryptology and developed training courses for reserve officers so that a cryptology manpower pool would be available for wartime mobilization.

William Friedman conducted some short courses in cryptology from 1930 to 1933 despite the absence of funding for any training. He also developed some extension courses for an Officer Reserve Corps program. By 1934 the SIS school was formed with 1st Lt. W. Preston Corderman as the instructor. Nine regular Army officers would receive extensive training in communications intelligence there by 1941. Signals intelligence field work was brought together in the 2d Signal Service Company established at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in January 1939.

Shortly after the Training Branch of the Signal Intelligence Service was formed in 1934, it devised a 16-month, inclusive program of instruction that covered elementary and advanced cipher and code solution, code compilation, machine ciphers, secret inks and code solution in the field. Its school opened on 4 September 1934 with two students and Lieut. Corderman acting as instruc-

tor. Other members of the agency gave classes. From 1934-1941, William Friedman wrote six text books on Military Cryptanalysis for extension courses conducted by the Army at universities around the country.

Although the coursework was extensive, only two officers were trained each year beginning in 1935 so that only a few Signals intelligence officers were available on the eve of World War II when vastly larger numbers would be needed.

Prior to World War II, Dwight Eisenhower remembered the "shocking deficiency" in intelligence assets that hampered planning. "The fault," he said, "was partly within and partly without the Army. The American public has always viewed with repugnance everything that smacks of the spy." George C. Marshall voiced a similar view of the pre-war situation. "Prior to World War II, our foreign intelligence was little more than what a military attache could learn at dinner, more or less over the coffee cups." Omar Bradley expressed the problem this way: "The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings [in World War II]. For too many years in the preparation of officers for command assignments, we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as intelligence...."

A centralized intelligence training school was proposed during the Army reorganization that followed World War I. The idea was turned down, but resurfaced just before World War II. An Army conference on training, scheduled for 8-13 December 1941, which would have heard this recommendation for a central Army intelligence school, was cancelled because of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

World War II

World War II was a war in which military intelligence training would come of age. It was a war which saw American intelligence cryptanalysts, like William Friedman with his Signal Intelligence Service, break key enemy codes. It was also the war of aerial photo reconnaissance, and by 1944 over 200 missions were flown and a half-million photos delivered.

Army manuals in 1940 called for specialized intelligence training at the regimental level. It covered a wide spectrum of subjects. Senior NCOs and officers assigned to intelligence duties would first attend a divisional course of instruction which was far-ranging. Intelligence schools at the General Headquarters level were provided for selected personnel who measured up to the "highest standards." They would receive instruction in "various military intelligence activities and detailed instruction on the enemy country and army."

An interesting sidelight on division-level intelligence training occurred during the fighting in North Africa. Frank B. Sargent was a private in the Combined Commando Unit of the 34th Infantry Division. He felt his combat experience could be useful to his comrades and wrote a training pamphlet for his unit entitled, *The Most Common Shortcomings in the Training of Battalion and Regimental S-2 Personnel, And Some Suggestions to Overcome These*. In this document he wrote: "The main thing in training of intelligence personnel is to keep them training all the time. To make them understand the larger points of their jobs and to teach them not to overlook the smaller ones. They have to be kept interested all the time. They 'have to do it themselves.' ...They must know the complexity of the Intelligence system and feel that they are an important cog in it."

Private Sargent's pamphlet came to the attention of Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, his division commander, who passed it on to General Eisenhower. The commander of Allied Forces in North Africa ordered it published and distributed throughout his command. When General George C. Marshall visited Eisenhower's headquarters, he too was impressed by the work and carried a copy back to Washington for distribution throughout the U.S. Army in 1943.

The Military Intelligence Service, formed in March 1942 and newly located in the Pentagon, was an operating agency of G2 that controlled intelligence work in the Zone of Interior, such as training for combat-bound soldiers in escape and evasion, and the interrogation of high-level enemy prisoners in U.S. prison camps.

The battle between G2 and G3, WDGS, over who had staff responsibility for field intelligence

training, which had raged throughout the inter-war years, again surfaced in 1941. Fearing that combat intelligence training was on the decline in the U.S. Army, the G2 issued a memorandum in September 1941 attributing poor quality of training to: "No intelligence plans; too much dependence on standing operating procedure; and an erroneous conception of Leavenworth's teaching concerning combat intelligence." The Military Intelligence Division gained an undisputed staff responsibility for field intelligence training in July 1942 when newly published AR 10-15 gave the division responsibility for the "preparation of plans and policies, and supervision of...Intelligence Training."¹

The general supervision of intelligence training during World War II rested with the Training Branch of the War Department's Military Intelligence Service. But the real work of training was accomplished at the various schools which exercised a great deal of autonomy in carrying out the instruction.

Now called the Training Group of the Military Intelligence Service, it exercised staff control of the Military Intelligence Training Center, and the Military Intelligence Service Language School, Chinese Language Schools at Yale and the University of California, and the Japanese Language School at the University of Michigan. It was also the point of contact in Army headquarters for training liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and the Army Service Forces.

To meet the growing demand for trained intelligence specialists in the field, the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) was authorized in May 1942, but did not begin operations at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, until 19 June 1942. It was staffed largely by MID staff and MI Reserve officers. The center's first commander was Lt. Col. Charles T. Benfill, AC. He served concurrently as Chief of the Training Division of MIS and Commandant of the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, an arrangement that proved unsatisfactory and was discontinued in January 1944. Operating in an old National Guard armory, the MITC trained combat intelligence specialists, just less than 20,000 of them during World War II.

Initially, a school for interrogators, interpreters and translators, the Military Intelligence Training Center expanded its curriculum in October 1942 to include terrain studies, signal communications, staff duties, counterintelligence, order of battle, photograph interpretation, and familiarity with enemy small arms. In February 1944 the Secretary of War gave the center the added mission of training intelligence personnel of divisions. A month-long course was inaugurated in March which taught foreign maps and equipment, enemy tactics, POW interrogation, photo interpretation, counterintelligence, order of battle, staff work, and the employment of specialist intelligence teams.

After graduating from the military censorship school at Fort Washington, Md., and the photo interpreter school at the Camp Ritchie Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC), Capt. Henry Hauser was assigned as an instructor and later Assistant Photo Interpretation Department chief at the MITC. He remembered that in 1943 the average class size for both officer and enlisted was 35. They worked seven days, then got the eighth off, a day they called "Benday" after the school's commander Lt. Col. Benfill. They used German and Italian POWs to instill realism in the interrogator training. After eight weeks the men were formed into photo interpreter teams and assigned to divisions, corps, armies and field armies.²



The Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Md, during World War II.

Were those MI specialists trained at Camp Ritchie prepared for duty in a combat theater of operations? A poll of 76 European Theater of Operations G2s taken after was unanimous in calling the training received at the Military Intelligence Training Center "well planned, but inadequate to prepare intelligence specialists to enter upon their work in the European Theater of Operations."³ Many of the graduates of the MITC had not received any basic military training and, as a result, were regarded as poor soldiers lacking discipline.

But the school at Ritchie did apparently give them confidence in their intelligence abilities as their morale was reported to be high when arriving in the Europe, and it was reported that "the intensive course offered at the Military Intelligence Training Center...give most of the graduates a great measure of inspiration and enthusiasm for their work." To give them the added knowledge and skills for intelligence work in a combat zone, a training program was set up in the spring of 1943 under the general direction of the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations.

The Field Interrogation Detachment took charge of the in-theater training of POW interrogator teams and MI interpreter teams, which would eventually incorporate actual prisoners of war. The Home Forces Intelligence Detachment, later known as the Photo Intelligence Center, based in England took responsibility for training newly arrived photo interpreter teams. Most of the instruction was provided by British and Canadian staff in the early days. Incoming order-of-battle teams got their training from the Order of Battle School, a subsidiary of the Military Intelligence Research Section, G-2, from January to October 1944, and after that from the Order of Battle Center that was relocated to France. They offered a nine-day basic course in German order of battle and a six-day course in the interpretation of enemy documents.⁴

The strength of the U.S. Army in 1939 was 189,839. By the end of 1941 it numbered 1.6 million. The challenge of mobilizing, equipping and training this burgeoning force was met by the Army as a whole and by the Counter Intelligence leadership in particular. The Corps of In-

telligence Police saw its circa 40-agent force grow to 1,026 after Pearl Harbor, and reach 7,500 by war's end.

In February 1941 training began at the Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators Training School in a single room at the Army War College located at Fort Leslie J. McNair. The first class of 188 men were taught by five full-time instructors whose mimeographed lectures became the training texts. The school's graduates would be responsible for internal security in the Army. The curriculum, which used the FBI basic courses as a model, was geared to criminal investigation with 61 courses being taught, addressing among other things the principles of observation and description, espionage and counterespionage, bombs, sabotage devices and undercover work.

The CIP school soon outgrew its single room and spilled over to other sites in the Washington area. Permanent quarters for the school were found at the Tower Town Club, a hotel in Chicago's Loop, and training began there in November 1941. With the 1 January 1942 redesignation of the Corps of Intelligence Police as the Counter Intelligence Corps, the school on Michigan Avenue was renamed the CIC Investigators Training School.

Agent William Attwood wrote about that early CIC Training:

In Chicago, in June of 1942, six months after Pearl Harbor, I was one of a detachment of some 30-odd agents from the Army Counter Intelligence Corps assigned to take an FBI course that, like so much of my subsequent military training, taught me very little that I would ever again put to use, in or out of the service. In Chicago we learned, among other things, how to pick locks, practice judo, lift fingerprints, make plaster molds of tire tracks, forge documents, and tail suspects. The last of these activities, dubbed surveillance, was the centerpiece of our final exam....

Although we were all sergeants, our uniforms in Chicago were army-issue civilian clothes, purchased by voucher at government-approved outlets. We were therefore identically attired in tan gabardine suits, button-down white shirts, plain-toed brown shoes, and inconspicuous ties....

Our Chicago bivouac was a former YMCA building near the Water Tower on North Michigan Avenue. There were classrooms, a cafeteria, a gym, and double-decker bunks in the single rooms. Also, this being a U.S. Army installation, a formation was held early every morning on the sidewalk. Passers-by were naturally puzzled to see a platoon of apparently able-bodied young civilians in gabardine suits being put through close-order drill by a uniformed lieutenant.⁵

Having moved in November 1942 to better accommodations on Chicago's South Side, the school became the CIC Advanced Training School, with basic CI training being accomplished in departments and service commands.

One example of a Service Command preliminary training school was the Third Service Command CIC Training School conducted in the former dormitories of Goucher College in Baltimore, Md. This extract from the *History of the Counterintelligence Corps* explains the scope of the preliminary training:

The theory behind the Third Service Command School curriculum was that CIC training fell into two primary classifications: military and investigative. The military aspects were to be obtained at Basic Training Centers in order that an agent could function properly when assigned a military mission. The investigative aspects were the responsibility of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Service Command felt that it should provide the basic investigative training and the apprentice training in a field office. Further specialized and advanced training was considered the province of CIC Headquarters and the War Department.

Upon completion of this course, the trainees were sufficiently well educated in investigative procedures to begin work as apprentice agents in Service Command field offices. Under the guidance of a special agent, each newly trained agent was given practical experience for four weeks. After showing himself to advantage during this apprenticeship period, the agent was advanced to the title of special agent and became eligible for further training at the CIC Advanced Training School

in Chicago.⁶

In order to ready CIC agents for combat duty, a CIC Staging Area was established, first at Army Air Base, Logan Field, Baltimore, in June 1943, then at Fort Holabird in August. To assist the CIC in performing its overseas mission, officers and a few enlisted men, were enrolled in the General Intelligence Course at the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Md. World War II agents also received specialized training in languages, mainly through the Berlitz Language Schools in Chicago, Baltimore, New York, and San Francisco. Some German instruction was given at the University of Pennsylvania in a program set up by Professor Otto Springer.


In April 1942 the first MI Officer's Candidate School opened at the Illinois Women's Athletic Club in Chicago, training and commissioning 30 candidates after an eight-week course. The school was discontinued after that first and last class, it having been determined in Washington that the Military Intelligence Division did not have a sufficient demand for officer personnel to justify a MI Officer Candidate School.

The Fourth Army opened its language school at the Presidio of San Francisco in the Fall of 1941 to teach Japanese. The school was moved in May 1942 to Camp Savage, Minnesota, and placed under the command of the Military Intelligence Service. In August 1944 it moved again to Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The school was credited with graduating 4,800 Japanese linguists during the war. Russian and Chinese language specialists were trained at various universities under MIS supervision. The MIS also trained 1,750 censorship specialists at Fort Washington, Maryland.

With the outbreak of the war, the signals intelligence effort burgeoned and large numbers of trained personnel were needed. The Signal Intelligence Service, which would undergo several wartime name changes and emerge in the summer of 1943 as the Signal Security Agency, began its schooling for officers at the Cryptographic Division, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, on 10 March 1942. After ten weeks the first fifteen officers were graduated and transferred to the Army Air Force for cryptographic security duties. The accelerated demand for officers necessitated operating the crowded Fort Monmouth classrooms

in two shifts.

Enlisted training in Cryptography and Cryptanalysis began in July of 1940 at Fort Monmouth, with a dozen men attending classes that lasted for less than one week. Technical Sergeant Max Leighty presided. This evolved into an Enlisted Cryptographic School on 1 March 1941, designed to train expert cryptanalysts. Twenty-six regular army students and three draftees were enrolled in April and May. In December the Cryptographic School was redesignated the Cryptographic Division of the Enlisted Men's Department, Signal Corps School. The officer in charge was Leighty, newly commissioned a second lieutenant. By January 1942 the school's student capacity was 150 and the course was cut from 48 to 26 weeks.⁷



The 7712th Intelligence School in Oberammergau, Germany after the second world war.

On 2 October 1942, the Cryptographic Division of the Eastern Signal Corps School, with its 39 officers and 226 enlisted men, was transferred from Fort Monmouth to Vint Hill Farms. It trained both officers and enlisted. It became known as the Signal Corps Cryptographic School. Here,

too, two shifts had to be conducted until the buildings under construction could be completed in May 1943. In 1943 it trained 230 officers and 2,299 enlisted students. After June 1944 it would be known as the Vint Hill Farms School. To one enlisted signals intelligence specialist it would be remembered as the "Third Battle of Manassas." The scope of the training required increased planning and coordination. A Director of Training was set up in the Signal Security Agency in March 1943 with Maj. Frank B. Rowlett at its head. The Training Branch operated a Civilian Training School at Arlington Hall Station, which had begun in 1939 at the old Munitions Building in Washington. It also ran the Signal Security School, as the extension courses and correspondence courses were called.

Some understanding of the methods and training devices can be gained from a history of the Training Division published in 1945. Using reports from the theaters of operation, the staff attempted to keep courses current and to find strengths and weaknesses of the training.

The methods of instruction have varied with the different courses. Originally, when adequate time was available, emphasis was placed on individual study. However, as demands for commissioned personnel increased, it was necessary to speed up the courses. Lectures, demonstrations and individual and team solution have been the principal methods of instruction used in cryptanalytic and code analytic courses. Lectures and independent study have been the principal methods of instruction used in the cryptographic equipment maintenance courses. ...With the exception of the normal field and technical manuals used for general military training, all training has been based on special texts, documents, devices, charts, mock-ups, etc., prepared either by Signal Security Agency or by the instructional overhead of the school.⁸

Tactical signals intelligence training was done under the control of the Signal Security Agency (formerly SIS) at Camp Crowder, Missouri, and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

The Army Air Forces conducted their intelligence training at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

It is interesting to note that, as the war drew to a close, planners in the Military Intelligence Service were recommending a peacetime organization for MI, based on the principle that "an effective and efficient system cannot be improvised after a war begins." One of the unique concepts to come out of the proposal for a post-war military intelligence organization was the creation of a "Military Intelligence Corps." Quoting from the Military Intelligence Service official history:

The Corps was designed as a means of securing and maintaining a body of trained intelligence personnel for the various activities of the Military Intelligence Service. It was proposed that it be made up of regular and reserve officers and a component of enlisted men. Wherever expert intelligence personnel were needed, they would be drawn from the Military Intelligence Corps. For their training, they would attend a Corps school... They would be rotated throughout the various activities of intelligence to gain experience and to maintain their status as professional intelligence officers.⁹

Civilian employees would also be trained and rotated in intelligence assignments to make them an adjunct to the Corps. The proposal had no chance of being adopted, however, in the post-war climate of demobilization.

The Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie was phased out after the war. But training resumed in counterintelligence at Fort Holabird in 1945. A Strategic Intelligence School was opened in Washington, D.C., in 1946 to train the Army's attaches. Overseas, training continued at places like Oberammergau, Germany, a facility run by the 7712th Intelligence School. The school was housed in a former SS barracks.

The closure of the MITC at Fort Ritchie left the Army Ground Forces without any intelligence training. Its commanding general, Gen. Jacob L. Devers, first activated an intelligence school at Fort Benning, Ga. in October 1945 to alleviate that gap and capture the lessons of World War II. The following month it was moved to Fort Riley, Kansas, to operate under the administrative purview of the Commandant, The Cavalry School. There, in the Winter and Spring of 1946, it was organized into three departments: General Sub-

jects, Photo Interpretation, and Order of Battle. Recognizing the close coordination needed in air and ground intelligence operations, it established a Department of Aerial Reconnaissance on 1 July 1946, subsuming the old photo interpretation department as a section and adding a section emphasizing air intelligence. The Department of General Subjects added a special projects section to handle Army extension courses and training literature. A new Department of Order of Battle and Interrogation of Prisoners of War revamped the old Order of Battle section and added a section on interrogation and exploitation of enemy documents.

In January 1946 Lt. Col. Hauser began a 12-year stint as Chief Instructor of the Army Photo Interpreter Department. Along with several other officers with extensive World War II intelligence experience, he first attended the Intelligence Department instruction, graduating in 1946 from the first Officer Intelligence Course.

A program published for the opening of The Intelligence School on 1 July 1946 claimed that it was the "first institution of its kind organized within Army Ground Forces. It grew from the combat experiences of World War II which showed that few officers or men were ready to assume the staggering jobs of intelligence activities in modern war."¹⁰

A full schedule of intelligence courses officially began in September 1946, but two interim classes were conducted before that and a special short course in photo interpretation. These first classes graduated 70 officers and 78 enlisted men qualified to perform intelligence duties in divisions and smaller units. Eight officers and 16 men were trained to function in order of battle teams, and 16 officers and 27 men were given photo interpretation schooling.

For its faculty, the Intelligence School sought only combat-experienced officers with extensive intelligence experience. Their branch was immaterial. The turnover of new instructors was high due to the army's drawdown and readjustment of its personnel.

The Cavalry School taught a preparatory subcourse in reconnaissance, scouting and patrolling that lasted for six weeks. Upon completion of the subcourse, officers began a 12 1/2-week

Officers' Intelligence Course at The Intelligence School. Upon completion the graduates were considered to be able to function as G-2s or S-2s. Three courses were conducted in the school year beginning in September. A seven-week course was instituted to train enlisted photo interpreters and a course of the same length turned out interrogators and analysts. The curriculum assumed that "in future emergencies...there will be an immediate shortage of personnel on the ground for action. ...Hence, all instruction is conducted to prepare graduates to act as instructors in their skills in the field."¹¹

In 1948 two instructors at the Command and General Staff College, Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson, published their book *Intelligence is for Commanders*. They wrote it, they said, to make the point that "Intelligence is not an academic exercise nor is it an end in itself. The prime purpose of intelligence is to help the commander make a decision, and thereby to proceed more accurately and more confidently with the accomplishment of his mission. This thought is the keynote of tactical intelligence."¹² The authors planted a doctrinal seed which would germinate 40 years later as the U.S. Army's official intelligence doctrine.

Korean War

The emergency anticipated by The Intelligence School planners came in June 1950 when the Soviet-backed North Korean Communists attacked the Republic of Korea. As intelligence specialists were graduated from The Intelligence School, they were shipped to Korea to MI units which supported tactical units. Detachments of MI specialists, CIC, and ASA personnel were attached to each division.

If the seeds of MI training can be said to have been planted during World War II, the roots took hold after the Korean War, a war in which intelligence training was woefully inadequate.

Holabird

The first root of the Military Intelligence training network went to ground at a place familiar

and dear to three generations of intelligence soldiers, a place called Fort Holabird. Holabird got its start as a Quartermaster Depot on 2 January 1918, when it was given the job of serving the Motor Transport Corps. Since 1945 the Army had been using the Holabird site to teach counterintelligence.



Fort Holabird in the industrial suburb of Baltimore, Md.

On 1 May 1955 the Combat Intelligence School at Fort Riley merged with the Counter Intelligence School at Fort Holabird. Lt. Col. Henry Hauser moved the Photo Interpretation Department to Maryland. He did not like the new facilities. He said, "Fort Holabird was a very small post adjacent to a cheap factory that had a brewery in it at one time. There were no buildings adequate for classrooms, so when I was moving the photo interpretation department there, we were moved into a building next to the brewery. It wasn't very good. There wasn't any terrain for field problems. You had to go to Camp A.P. Hill, Virginia, to set up installations to photograph and train our students."¹³ But, for the first time, the intelligence soldier had a place, such as it was, that he could identify with.

For the Military Intelligence student, the process of identifying with Holabird was not always without trauma. It was a greasy, industrial kind of place. But however modest, Holabird was a beginning. It could be said that MI within the U.S. Army was coming of age. It had pushed up through the topsoil and was enjoying its time in the sun.

One graduate of the MI Officers Basic Course at Fort Holabird in the summer of 1972 left this record of his MI training experience:

Fort Holabird, located in a bleak industrial neighborhood of Baltimore called Dundalk, was the home of the MI branch in the 1960s. It was there that presumably we would be initiated into the arcane rituals, customs, and operating procedures of military intelligence. The course lasted only about a month, however, and I found too much of it to be disappointingly irrelevant to my assignment to Vietnam.

We sat in closed classroom buildings day after day, watching poorly produced slide shows and listening to lectures intended to familiarize us with the purposes, organizational structures, and techniques of our craft. The first thing we learned was the difference between information and intelligence—and the difference in our branch between those who simply collected information, and those who turned it into intelligence by analyzing it. I could tell right away that I was destined to dwell at the bottom of this figurative food chain. A combat intelligence officer, that is, a graduate of the MI branch Basic Course at Fort Holabird, was by definition only a generalist. He might be qualified to collect data from a variety of human and/or electronic sources, but the transformation of that raw data into assessments of enemy capabilities and intentions would be reserved for higher-ups with either more rank or more extensive training. Fort Holabird was just a boot camp for MI.


As the beautiful autumn days went by outside, we studied the “intelligence cycle”—how the essential elements of information (EEI) a commander needs to know are developed, collected, reported, disseminated, analyzed,

and finally applied. From a progression of seemingly endless line-of-block charts, we learned the basic organization of both civilian and military intelligence agencies in the U.S. and around the world, especially those in the Communist bloc.

We were introduced, but only sketchily, to the functions of various component parts of our branch—counterintelligence, image interpretation, electronic surveillance, and technical intelligence (examining foreign equipment and material). We were issued copies of the basic MI bible, the FM 30-5 field manual, and told to commit most of it to memory. We were taught the fearfully strict set of rules about handling and protecting classified documents, and told all about confidential, secret, and top-secret clearances granted to people at different levels of the intelligence community.

...My hopes of learning the more adventurous tricks of my chosen trade, like lockpicking, microfilming valuable enemy documents and seducing gorgeous foreign agents were dashed, however. The courses at Fort Holabird were straightforward and decidedly unexciting.¹⁴

While all this was happening in Maryland, a second anchoring root of the intelligence training system was concurrently taking hold in Massachusetts. Fort Devens was established in 1917 to mobilize and train the 76th Division.



Revere Hall at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens.

The Army Security Agency, created in September 1945 to assume the mission of the former Signal Intelligence Service, opened a training school at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia, during the war. The school was moved to Carlisle Barracks,

Pa., briefly, and finally to Fort Devens in 1951, where it was the Army's mainstay for cryptologic training. In 1957 it was renamed the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School. It became part of the Army Intelligence Center and School in 1976. The U.S. Army Security Agency school at Fort Devens injected realism into its training with its "Vietcong" demonstration platoon and a mock Vietnamese hamlet.

The year 1967 was the genesis of a dream for the men and women of the intelligence community. The Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson approved on 1 July the recommendations of the Norris Board, a body specially created to look at the Army's intelligence programs and organization. As a result, the old Army Intelligence and Security Branch, which had included the Army Security Agency, now became the Military Intelligence Branch. The MI mission changed from one of combat service support to combat support. Now the Army began studying the possibility of moving the Intelligence School from Fort Holabird and centralizing the training for the many intelligence specialties.

Training requirements were increased in 1962 when the intelligence function, which had been performed by officers and men from other Army branches, got its own MI branch. The school at Holabird, hemmed in by industrial complexes and overcrowded by the increased demands of the Vietnam War, was now clearly inadequate. In early 1969, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian began to brief an idea he had for an Intelligence Center and was given the go-ahead to implement the plan by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff. In February 1970 the Blakefield Board, named after its chairman Maj. Gen. William Blakefield, commandant of the Intelligence School at Holabird, recommended that Fort Huachuca be the site for that center.

During the Vietnam War, intel doctrine, assets, and technology proliferated, calling for specialized training over a wide ranging spectrum. A host of innovations made intelligence training for a greater number of soldiers an imperative.

Huachuca

There were three separate intelligence schools in 1970. There was the Army Security Agency School at Fort Devens, the Intelligence School that was at Holabird, and the Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School at Fort Huachuca. General McChristian felt that “over the years as these schools were separated..., that not only were we failing to have people in intelligence train together and work together and exchange ideas together, but we were bringing about a split in the...Military Intelligence Branch itself.”¹⁵ He elaborated upon his concept for a home of Military Intelligence.

...I thought if we can bring one of each type of intelligence unit and put it at a home, they always know to come back to that home; unless they are needed elsewhere to perform a mission....

And then you have a...young lieutenant, coming to that basic course we needed so badly, and which I must state here could not in my judgment have ever been conducted at Fort Meade or Fort Holabird. We needed so badly to take those young men we were going to train and say “Here are all the various types of intelligence equipment from sensors on the battlefield to planes in the sky, and others, of which you need to know the limitations and capabilities, to be able to work with the tactical units you are going to support.”

This is not available today in our Army at any one place. It is better at Huachuca today than it was at Holabird, because we have two schools together. We do have open spaces, we can take people out and turn on radars; we can do a lot more.

...My concept is basically this: A home where all intelligence schools, all intelligence units, and all intelligence activities of the Army that are not required to be located someplace else, are established for the first time in our history where they can work together, and find out how one can help the other; because it is team work, you do not do intelligence in compartments. They must help each other on the battlefield.¹⁶

Basing his opinions on 38 years in the Army

during which he rose from private to major general, serving as Chief of Intelligence for General George Patton’s Third Army, the head of intelligence for General William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam, and, just before his retirement in 1971, the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, McChristian told a congressional subcommittee that he believed strongly “that there is no staff function more important to a decision-maker than intelligence. Knowledge is a big factor of power.”

McChristian visited Huachuca in March 1969. He said, “When I arrived there and saw Huachuca, I said, ‘Gee, if we could have this entire post as an Intelligence Center, it looks good to me.’” Upon his return to Washington, he briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and told him that Huachuca seemed a good candidate for an Intelligence Center. There were other candidates—Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Lewis, Washington. Huachuca had the advantage of a larger area in which to train and an uncluttered electromagnetic spectrum.

But like any transplanting operation, the transfer of the Intel School to the high desert of the Southwest would not be simple. There was the question of water. It was originally thought that there would not be enough to sustain the added population. And the facilities at Huachuca were primitive: A vacant World War II station hospital and barracks built in 1940. But a decision was made by the Army Chief of Staff in November 1970. General Harold K. Johnson directed the Army’s Intelligence School be moved from Holabird to Fort Huachuca and renamed. Fort Huachuca became the “Home for Military Intelligence” on 23 March 1971 when the Intelligence Center and School was officially created.

Opposition to the move to Huachuca was led by Congressman Clarence D. Long, a Democrat from Maryland, who understandably was moved by the loss of Fort Holabird in his district, and the chairman of the House Armed Service Investigating Subcommittee on Relocating the U.S. Army Intelligence School...to Huachuca, Representative Otis G. Pike from New York, who one Army general compared to Joseph McCarthy for his zeal in attacking the Department of the Army.¹⁷

Long wondered how the Intelligence School in

the Arizona desert would “attract qualified people to work in that sparsely populated area.”¹⁸ There were also the real problems of housing shortage and insufficient water to support the larger population, although the water problem subsequently proved to have been grossly exaggerated.

Congressman Pike tried to undermine the reasoning for choosing Huachuca based on the absence of electronic clutter. In questioning Maj. Gen. Linton S. Boatwright, who had chaired a Long-Range Stationing Study, he asked, “If anybody ever got mad at us down in Mexico could they not generate quite a lot of electronic clutter?” General Boatwright replied that “if the Mexicans turned against us they could, yes.”

The Intelligence School completed its move from Holabird to Huachuca in September 1971. It was a *fait accompli*. The House Subcommittee which investigated the move a year later could only fume that the Army “failed to consider the cost of the relocation at Fort Huachuca and the resource problems which existed at that post.” The subcommittee concluded that, “while Fort Huachuca does provide larger training areas which permit exercises with electronic equipment and aircraft, it falls far short of the Center conceived by Gen. McChristian. ...It appears that is a high price to pay for the luxury of not admitting a mistake in the selection of Fort Huachuca.”¹⁹ The school grew with the addition of a school support element in 1972, and the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course.

Following a March 1973 reorganization, the Intelligence Center and School acquired the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency and in July took over the U.S. Army Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School.²⁰ Now the school had added the mission of combat development as it related to intelligence doctrine, organization, and material studies. It became the proponent for surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation operations, known as STANO. The school offered 39 various courses of instruction, including the MI Officer Basic Course and the MI Officer Advanced Course. Its expanded role called for a higher graded commandant and on 7 May 1973 Brig. Gen. Harry H. Hiestand became the first general officer to command the Intelligence Cen-

ter and School. He found the most significant achievement during his tenure to be “our recognition as the Intelligence Center for the United States Army.”


But the facilities did not grow with the mission. A student coming to Fort Huachuca in the 1970s would attend class in those World War II cantonment buildings that were hurriedly built in the 1940s as a temporary station hospital.



Riley Barracks, the headquarters for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School in 1976.

An Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, ratified by the Army leadership in 1975, paved the way for the eventual consolidation of MI training at the Center and School. The Army Security Agency Training Center and School and the ASA Combat Development Activity at Fort Devens were transferred to the U.S. Army Train-

ing and Doctrine Command control and that headquarters, in turn, placed those organizations under the command of the Intelligence Center and School in October 1976.



The first classrooms at Fort Huachuca were wards of a World War II temporary hospital.

Now intel training was indeed consolidated under one organization, but the sites for that train-

ing were still scattered at four separate campuses—Fort Huachuca, Fort Devens, Goodfellow Air Base, Texas, and the Naval Technical Training Center at Corry Station, Florida. The U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens handled the intelligence and electronic warfare training for both officer and enlisted personnel, relying for help on its two detachments at Goodfellow AF Base and Corry Station, Florida. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School taught the MI Officer Basic and Advanced courses, courses in combat intelligence, tactical reconnaissance and surveillance, and counterintelligence.²¹

Also in October 1976 the school took over for its headquarters a building known as Riley Barracks which had been built a few years earlier as a barracks for Fort Huachuca's Troop Command. It was a definite improvement, not only of the command group which was installed there, but for the students who would be billeted in these more acceptable accommodations.

In 1975 a concept was introduced at the Intelligence Center and School that would change the way the intelligence professional provided information to the commander. Called Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, it was a systematic and standard way of collecting and managing information on terrain, weather, and enemy doctrine in order to elucidate the enemy's probable courses of action. It better supported the commander through all phases of hostilities and provided a picture in a graphic rather than a narrative mode. By 1982, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield was incorporated as doctrine in the *Intelligence Element of Airborne Operations*, and taught at the school. A digital terrain database was developed to incorporate IPB into the All-Source Analysis System.

Beginning in 1977, TRADOC authorized a position in the grade of colonel known as TRADOC Systems Manager for each of the Army's new weapons and equipment systems. In the beginning, three TSMs were assigned to the Intelligence Center and School. The TSM was responsible for managing a specific system from its inception to fielding. He would oversee the development, testing, production and fielding of an item of equipment and act as TRADOC's single representative with the contractor and interested

Army staff agencies. But the TSM also reported to the Commander of the Intelligence Center and School. The TSM program put the Intelligence Center and School at the center of IEW systems development and gave it a voice in IEW systems innovations and doctrine.

The landscape was beginning to change at Huachuca. Phase I academic facilities of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School were completed in October 1980. This phase encompassed four buildings and two parking lots, and cost approximately \$6.2 million. They are known today as Alvarado, Sisler and Walker Halls. The complex took on the appearance of a sapling that had weathered the Arizona drought.

The Intelligence Center and School acquired a larger share of the training mission in 1982 when it took over from Fort Devens SIGINT and EW training for officers, known as Specialty 37. This followed a Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), a comprehensive look at the jobs a MI officer would have to perform, called for by TRADOC. It determined that MI lieutenants and captains needed to be trained in tactical intelligence derived from all sources. The instruction in tactical intelligence (Specialty 35A); imagery intelligence (Specialty 35C); counterintelligence, human intelligence, and signal security (Specialty 36); and signals intelligence and electronic warfare (Specialty 37) could best be accomplished at a single location—Fort Huachuca. The transfer of Specialty 37 courses allowed Fort Devens to concentrate on the increased training requirements for the enlisted career management field 98, while at the same time giving Huachuca the ability to initiate tactical all-source intelligence training for company grade officers.



The first new construction for the Intelligence Center and School came in 1983 with the complex containing Alvarado, Walker and Mashbir Halls.

In 1983 construction was begun on another multi-building complex. Two buildings were in use by the end of 1984 and the third by the spring of 1987. The last mentioned was the \$9 million Strategic Interrogation Debriefing Facility named Mashbir Hall.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved in 1983 an MI unit for Fort Huachuca. The 1st

School Brigade, which had provided command and control for the 2,000 soldiers assigned to the Intelligence Center and School since 1973 was redesignated the 111th MI Brigade (Training) on 17 March 1987. The unit allowed more hands-on training, field training and training realism for MI soldiers.

In 1984 the Intelligence School conducted a detailed study on the role of female soldiers in MI. The goal of the study, according to Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, was to “maximize the role of women while at the same time assuring career opportunities and assignment variety for both males and females.” The study looked at both officer and enlisted jobs that could be filled by women. By 1988, the MI Corps was recommending opening some 400 positions in tactical, forward-deployed CEWI units to women to give them tactical experience and a more equitable rotation between tactical and nontactical units.

Funding was approved and plans were underway in 1984 to build an 3,800 square foot addition to Riley Barracks that would house the headquarters of the Training Support Company (CEWI). Congressional approval was received for a new HUMINT academic building.

In 1985 the center and school added the pronency for the Remotely Piloted Vehicles/ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (RPV/UAV), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), thereby taking a wider responsibility for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) assets. At the same time it also gained the responsibility for battlefield deception and battlefield weather operations, projecting large increases in the training load.


At the end of his tour in July 1985, General Sidney Weinstein said that he was “confident that we are sending the best trained MI soldiers that the Center and School has ever produced to tactical and strategic assignments throughout the world.” He went on to say that he was just as proud of all that had been done “in the development and fielding of IEW systems and equipment and work on the design of the proper MI force structure.”²²

It was at this time that the training of MI student officers and NCOs was enhanced through

the development and use of an automated division-level simulation called the G2 Workstation. When the workstation began operation in 1984, the initial focus was on automation support of intelligence functions of the G2 Workstation into a training simulation for intelligence operations began in 1985. The workstation simulated the functions and operations of the division intelligence system in a classroom environment. Players participating in a G2 Workstation exercise conducted all phases of the intelligence cycle as they would in the field with the exception of the actual collection of intelligence data.

On 30 April 1986, Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr. broke ground near Cushing Street to begin construction of a new general instruction building. The 40,000-square-foot facility contained fifteen classrooms for human intelligence training, which would become known, upon its completion in September 1987, as Tallmadge Hall.

On 31 August 1987, a \$5 million contract was awarded for the construction of the All-Source Analysis Training Center Facility that would automate manual methods of training. The 65,000-square-foot general instruction building would contain twenty-two classrooms, administrative and support space and laboratories. It was completed in 1990 and called Rowe Hall.



The colors pass in review at ceremonies marking the activation of the Military Intelligence Corps in 1987.

The Military Intelligence Corps was activated on 1 July 1987. Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr., described the goals and impact of the new corps. For the first time, “it bound soldiers and civilians, active and reserve component alike into a regimental organization proud of its heritage and committed to mission excellence in support of tactical and theater commander and national-level decision makers.” General Parker continued, “...We must educate not only our brethren in the combat arms but also our junior MI officers that successful service as a maneuver battalion or brigade S2 can be just as career enhancing as MI company command.”²³

In October of that year the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management (CIPMIS) began to be implemented. It fully integrated the MI civilian workforce into the personnel proponent system.

It was a year when the USAICS began its own NCO Academy, one that would become a model for other academies. The Chief of the MI Corps approved in March 1987 the establishment of an

MI Corps Historical Holding, the first step in creating an MI Museum.

On 1 July 1988, the MI Corps Hall of Fame was unveiled, and its first eighty-nine members inducted. These individuals were recognized as having made significant contributions to the growth and development of the MI Corps. Distinguished Members of the Corps (DMOC), by virtue of their accomplishments that qualified them for their membership, were automatically inducted into the Hall of Fame.

Consolidation

In May of 1990 it was announced that \$25 million of planned construction would take place at Huachuca, most of that being new buildings to accommodate the students, instructors and administrative personnel that were projected to be transferred from Fort Devens in connection with the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988.

Fort Devens, which had a long tradition of signals intelligence training, dating back to its Army Security Agency days beginning in 1951, would now move to the desert to be grafted onto the main trunk.

On 1 October 1990, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command assumed command of the installation as part of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure initiative. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command became a tenant activity and the U.S. Army Intelligence headquarters replaced it as the controlling headquarters. Maj. Gen. Paul E. Menoher, Jr., commanding the center and school, became the installation commander.

On 18 June 1991 a ground-breaking ceremony marked the beginning of the first phase of construction for the consolidated Intelligence Center. This phase included seven barracks buildings, two dining facilities, two applied instruction buildings, a SIGINT/EW maintenance facility, and utilities and roads to support the complex. The initial phase, for which ground was broke in June 1991, was valued at \$104 million, with additional contracts let for a second round of construction, including a \$20 million Unmanned Aerial Vehicle training facility, a self-contained NCO Academy, athletic, medical, and PX facilities.

Ever since the Norris Board had endorsed in 1967 the concept of all intelligence training being conducted at a single site, planning moved in that direction. There was political resistance from those states losing assets. And there was the problem of funding suitable facilities. But 26 years later, the end was truly in sight. All military intelligence disciplines would be taught at Fort Huachuca, now the Home of Military Intelligence in an all-embracing sense.

During 1992 the creosote-covered lower slopes of the Huachucas were transformed into what looked like a major college campus as the construction of six new barracks, two dining halls, two applied instruction buildings, and a self-contained new NCO Academy, including barracks and an instruction building, neared completion. In addition, construction began on a Joint UAV Training Center.

The new academic complex was designed to accommodate the students and instructors who began arriving in force in early 1994 from Fort Devens. It became a symbol of the long-cherished dream of all U.S. Army military intelligence training being consolidated at one location. That dream was enabled by the Base Closure and Realignment Act, or BRAC, of 1988, which called for the move of the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. A small Forward Transition Support element from Devens arrived in August 1992. The new school buildings, the new technology, and the new doctrine began to be characterized in 1993 as a "Revolution in Military Intelligence."

Maj. Gen. Paul E. Menoher, Jr., summed up the MI revolution when he said in July: "The revolution is multi-faceted. You've got the fourteen new systems, you've got the new operational concept, you've got the new organizational designs, you've got the new doctrine and the new training. All of those things are coming together to make us better prepared to support commanders on the modern battlefield, a force-projection battlefield."²⁴



Nicholson Hall, part of the new Base Realignment and Closure construction that accommodated the consolidation of the school at Fort Devens with the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca.

When Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing took his American Expeditionary Force to France in July 1917, it was without a general staff with such crucial elements as an intelligence organization. Pershing would organize one, but the more experienced European military leaders looked askance at this green American headquarters scrambling to catch up to the accepted military science of the day. They wanted to absorb the disorganized Americans into their own formations. A French general lectured Pershing that it

“takes 30 years” to establish a working general staff. Pershing shot back, “It never took America 30 years to do anything.”²⁵

Pershing’s reaction embodies the parable of American military history. In each crisis, the U.S. Army had to marshal all of its ingenuity and energy, often with allied help, to build a military capability on a par with its adversaries. It was the price to be paid for not supporting a large standing Army. In the initial stages of its wars, the sacrifice of lives to buy time to mobilize was disproportionate and tragic. But, until Vietnam, the U.S. Army would always meet the challenge and discover the resources needed to succeed. This reinforced the attitude that resourcefulness could offset unpreparedness. The American Army could do in six months what the European armies took 30 years to accomplish.

This brief review of military intelligence training mirrors the larger pattern of the Army’s admirable achievements in wartime, and quick structural decline in peacetime. The story of MI training is really the tale of remarkable individuals who were not only struggling against the American reluctance to pay for a large regular Army, but often against unenlightened officers in their own chain of command. Arthur L. Wagner, Ralph Van Deman, Marlborough Churchill, Dennis E. Nolan, Walter C. Sweeney, James H. Reeves, William F. Friedman, George Goddard, Robert R. Glass, Phillip B. Davidson, Joseph A. McChristian, Paul E. Menoher, Jr., John F. Stewart, Jr.... It is a roster of farsighted leaders who spoke in one voice over a century, calling for the maintenance of military intelligence during peacetime through the establishment of a comprehensive training program. There is also in their writings an unbroken and emphatic recognition that the primary importance of intelligence work is to the battlefield commander. They established a tradition that finds expression in today’s doctrinal truism: “Intelligence is for Commanders.”

In the era following the Vietnam War, the improvements in military intelligence are incontestably revolutionary and those men who made the case time and again for a better intelligence organization would be encouraged by the standing of military intelligence in the modern U.S. Army.

Whether it can withstand the budgetary retrenchments and peacetime slide towards indifference that has historically followed emergencies, will depend, in large part, on those MI men and women who read these words.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 366, 369.

² . Hauser, Col. Henry F., interview with Capt. John Della-Giustina on 24 January and 15 March 1994. Transcript filed in Command Historian’s Office, USAIC&FH.

³ *Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations—Procurement, Training, Supply, Administration, and Utilization of Intelligence Personnel*, Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, G-2 Section, Study Number 12, undated.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Edwards, Duvall A., *Spy Catchers of the U.S. Army in the War with Japan*, Red Apple Publishing, Gig Harbor, WA, 1994, p. 77.

⁶ *History of the Counter Intelligence Corps*, Vol. VI of XXX, “Training of CIC Personnel,” National Archives, Record Group 319.

⁷ *History of Training in Signal Security Agency and Training Branch, Signal Security Agency*, Prepared under the Direction of the Chief Signal Officer, SSA, Washington, D.C., 15 April 1945.

⁸ . Finnegan, John P., and Gilbert, James L., eds., *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History*, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1993.

⁹ . Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, *A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945*, typescript, Washington, D.C.

¹⁰ “Formal Opening, The Intelligence School, Fort Riley, Kansas,” a five-page program dated 1 July 1946.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Glass, Robert R., and Davidson, Phillip B., *Intelligence is For Commanders*, Military Services Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1948, pp. ix.

¹³Hauser interview.

¹⁴ Smith, Eric McAllister, *Not By the Book: A Combat Intelligence Officer in Vietnam*, Ivy Books, New York, 1993, pp. 14-16.

¹⁵ *Relocation of the U.S. Army Intelligence from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca*, Hearing before the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, held May 10, 1972. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁷ Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A., *Silent Missions*, Doubleday and Company, New York, 1978.

¹⁸ *House of Representatives*, p. 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 13.

²⁰ The Combat Surveillance School and Training Center had existed at Huachuca under one name or another since December 1957. By 1966 it offered 20 different courses of instruction which varied in length from three and one-half days to 24 weeks. Some of the subjects were Ground Surveillance Radar Systems, Airborne Sensor Systems, the Light Target Missile System, and Advanced Individual Training Courses. An Orientation Course was designed to familiarize officers with the combat surveillance equipment "now, or soon to be in the hands of the troops."

²¹ *Annual Command History, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, CY 76*, pp. 11-4.

²² Weinstein, Maj. Gen. Sidney T., *End of Tour Report*, dated 1 August 1985, Office of the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

²³ Parker, Maj. Gen. Julius, Jr., *End of Tour Report*, 8 September 1989, ATSI-CG, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

²⁴ Exit Interview with Maj. Gen. Paul Menoher, Jr., Commander of the U.S. Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, transcript, 23 July 1993, on file in USAIC&FH Command Historian's Office.

²⁵ [Quoted in Tuchman, Barbara, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1941-45*, Macmillan, New York, 1971, p. 62.]

¹ Reardon, Carol, *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865-1920*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1990, p. 37.

² Goddard, George W., with DeWitt S. Copp, *Overview: A Lifelong Adventure in Aerial Photography*, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1969, p. 8.

³ *Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual*, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1918.

⁴ Walsh, James P., "United States Army Intelligence School, France 1918," *Military Intelligence*, vol. 2, no. 1, April/May/June 1975, pp. 10-11.

⁵ Parish, John C., "Intelligence Work at First Army Headquarters," *The Historical Outlook*, Volume XI, Number 6, Philadelphia, June 1920.

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⁷ Churchill, Marlborough, "The Military Intelligence Division General Staff," *Journal of U.S. Artillery*, April 1920.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ U.S. War Department, *Records of the General Staff, Record Group 165, Selected Documents*, The National Archives, Washington, D.C., unpaginated.

¹⁰ Sweeney, Walter C., *Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War*, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, 1924.

¹¹ Bidwell, Bruce W., *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941*, University Publications of America, Frederick, MD, 1986, pp. 359-69.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 360.

¹³ Goddard, pp. 215-17.

¹⁴ Schwien, Edwin E., *Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission*, The Infantry Journal, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1936.

¹⁵ Bidwell, p. 362.