

Foreword

The 21st century will bring challenges and changes in the nature of warfare which will alter the way we do business in military intelligence (MI). **Intelligence Training XXI: Ready Now** will meet those challenges by providing the intelligence training needed for the Army XXI force.

It is our charter as the MI proponent of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to determine the path which MI must follow to answer future battle requirements. We must develop the doctrine, organizations, and systems and provide the training needed to meet those requirements. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and units in the field have engaged in a process to identify future requirements—the result is an MI Branch Concept that is now our focus for the future. The vision statement for Intelligence XXI reads:

To provide the Ground Component Commander, in a Joint environment, with a knowledge based, prediction oriented Intelligence system, supporting the commander driven requirements of an information age Power Projection Army (Force XXI) capable of land force dominance across the continuum of 21st Century military operations. At the center of this vision are quality soldiers, leaders, and civilians—soldiers, leaders, and civilians whose potential is more closely realized by Information Technology assisting in the collection, production and the presentation of Intelligence, providing the Commander with an understanding of the battlefield, or environment of military operations, and the ability to dominate information.

With this vision and guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commanding General of TRADOC, we are developing new training strategies. **Intelligence Training XXI: Ready Now** begins the execution of our plan to implement those strategies. It also reflects a shift in our core competencies that corresponds to new systems and technology; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures which result from the development of Force XXI. The fielding of new systems to support Force XXI demands that we develop training to produce professionals who are absolutely proficient operators and maintainers. Further, new technology provides the Intelligence School with improved methods to conduct training, including virtual and constructive simulations along with other distance learning techniques.

Intelligence Training XXI: Ready Now will steer us toward providing seamless training to MI soldiers and the combined arms organizations we support. This is the azimuth and basis for our training future.

CHARLES W. THOMAS
Major General, USA
Commanding General

Preface


Intelligence Training XXI: Ready Now, when combined with its subordinate operation plans (OPLANs), will serve as the Action Plan supporting the transition to the environment described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Force XXI) and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-75 (INTEL XXI).

To provide realistic, exacting training to intelligence leaders and soldiers who will execute Army XXI missions dictates that we provide seamless training at the individual, institutional, and unit levels.

This Action Plan presents four broad goals which will lead MI Branch into the training environment required to execute on the fast-paced, quickly changing Army XXI battlefield.

Subordinate to each goal is a series of enabling objectives. The objectives, although broad, are tangibly measurable. As such, each objective is tasked to a **lead** organization; other organizations are specifically tasked to **assist**. Lead organizations are responsible for completing the given objective and identifying and completing all specified and implied tasks and subtasks.

Lead organizations will produce the OPLAN required to complete each objective. These OPLANs are the key enabling documentation which, when appended to Intelligence Training XXI, convert this vision into an Action Plan as envisioned by Army Training XXI. Each lead organization will present a proposed OPLAN to the Deputy Commanding General. The OPLAN will relate the entire plan to complete the assigned objective, including a timeline, deliverables, and the necessary resources.



Part One

Introduction

Intelligence Training XXI is the Army's concept for training Military Intelligence soldiers, leaders, and forces Armywide to perform effectively on the Army XXI battlefield. It is also the concept by which combined arms commanders and their warfighter staff will achieve proficiency in employing the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS). It provides several enablers to improve individual and unit training. Finally, it is the concept to transition the Intelligence Center to a "Schoolhouse Without Walls" that is capable of and committed to the notion of seamless support to intelligence readiness across the Army.

This document was developed from an analysis of requirements to support Army XXI. In large part, these requirements are described in two TRADOC publications: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, and related publications, which describe the characteristics and context of Army XXI operations; and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-75, which describes the concept and requirements for intelligence support to Army XXI. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-75 also includes a description of how the Army's future intelligence force will be organized, equipped, and employed as an integral part of Army XXI operations.

The concepts and associated skills required by this strategy to produce effective intelligence support apply to all forms of future operations: traditional mid-intensity conflict and what is known today as nontraditional stability and support operations (SASO), such as peacekeeping, peace support, nation building, and humanitarian assistance. The principles applied to providing intelligence in these two different operational settings are the same, but there will be differences in techniques and emphasis owing principally to differences in operational tempo (OPTEMPO), size of the battlespace, environment, diversity of the threats, and different demands placed on the system by the commander in terms of resolution, accuracy, and timing.

It is important to note that "Warfighter," when used in describing Intelligence XXI and its associated training concept, means the full Army XXI fighting team that is headed by the commander and includes the intelligence staffs and organizations supporting those commanders. In Army XXI, intelligence operations must be thoroughly synchronized and integrated with other operations to meet their demanding requirements and to achieve decisive results.

Part One will discuss three concepts central to understanding the vision which drives Intelligence Training XXI. These concepts provide the focus and framework for developing training to support Army XXI. The concepts are—

- **Army XXI.**
- **Intelligence XXI.**
- **Army Training XXI.**

Part Two describes the Intelligence Training XXI **Vision, Training Imperatives, and Goals.**

Part Three identifies the specific **Objectives** and actions that must be taken in order to satisfy the stated Goals of Intelligence Training XXI and thus the intelligence requirements of Army XXI commanders.

A Quick Reference Guide is included at the end of this document to provide users a consolidated listing of key topics.

ARMY XXI

Twenty-first century commanders will operate in a high speed, public, and potentially lethal battlespace that is embedded in a highly complex strategic environment. The range and complexity of military operations required to meet the strategic needs of the United States will have significant implications for future military operations and the intelligence system that will support them. The National Military Strategy focuses us now and into the future on—

- Regional conflicts.
- Crisis response.
- Power projection.
- Joint, coalition, and interagency operations.
- A wide variety of ambiguous threats.


Other factors that will influence the development of the intelligence force over the next two decades include—

- Reduced defense spending.
- Significant growth in information technologies and digitization.
- Reduced forward presence.

- Nontraditional military missions.
- Proliferation of weapons and technology, which will make our potential adversaries more lethal and dangerous than ever before.

Recent operations in Southwest Asia, Panama, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia have given us a preview of the challenges that lie ahead and the wide range of missions that the 21st century U.S. Army must be capable of accomplishing. These recent operations also illustrate the complexity of force projection into both traditional and nontraditional military settings, and they amplify the critical role that technology will play in the future. Finally, these recent operations reinforce the premise that **information** operations, undertaken to gain information dominance, will be critical to the successful conduct of **decisive** operations.

Army XXI operations will follow certain patterns that define how operations will unfold. These ***patterns of operations*** will not be phased or sequential, rather they will prevail throughout the operational continuum from planning to execution to redeployment. These patterns, briefly shown below, will place significant demands on the Army XXI warfighting team and carry enormous implications for the 21st century intelligence force and how it will train.



Protect the Force

Force protection will provide organizational, materiel, technical, and operational solutions to the challenge of protecting soldiers, equipment, organizations, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

Project the Force

No matter where future conflicts or military operations take place, forces will have to deploy with tailored force packages that are able to maintain effective command and situation awareness enroute and are ready to operate upon arrival.

Gain Information Dominance

Gaining information dominance means knowing more about the battlespace and operations than our opponent knows. The key is to achieve information dominance at the critical time (window) to enable the commander to make the necessary decisions for success. This dominance is achieved through the execution of information operations which include command and control warfare (C²W); the establishment of a robust,

secure command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) network; and the production of battle command information (intelligence, friendly force, and other relevant information). Of course, information dominance will vary over time. It is neither assured nor continuous, but gaining information dominance is likely to be the pivotal factor in shaping the battlespace for decisive operations.

Shape the Battlespace

Commanders shape the battlespace to set the conditions for decisive operations. This includes the conduct of deep operations, C²W, and the positioning of friendly forces to take advantage of the operational environment for success in decisive operations. The goal is to eliminate the enemy's ability to fight effectively. Information dominance, resulting in large part from situation awareness and information operations, will be the principal factor in affording the commander the ability to create "windows of advantage" to shape the battlespace for successful decisive operations.

Decisive Operations

Decisive operations are the means by which success is achieved. They require the precise integration and application of combat power and combat multipliers provided by joint, multinational, and nongovernmental forces and organizations.

Sustain the Force

Army XXI sustainment entails the capability both to logistically sustain the speed of operations and to permit rapid transition between operational phases. Essential to the successful conduct of all operations is a high state of system readiness. System readiness will be assured by the fielding of highly reliable, technologically superior systems based largely upon common hardware and software and supported by a responsive, capable, and diverse corps of system maintainers.


Although the patterns mentioned above apply to traditional operations as well as SASO, the particular context in which the mission is executed will create different demands on the degree and nature of intelligence support required. For example, the wide range of unpredictable threats in a peace enforcement operation; the likely inclusion of diverse joint and coalition augmentation capabilities; and political pressures to minimize casualties will likely demand intelligence support to force protection that is significantly different from that provided in a mid-intensity conflict. These characteristics—coupled with the added elements of speed, precision, and high lethality fires—will significantly influence the way we operate and train.

Intelligence **leaders** and **forces** must accomplish operations across the range of missions and environments detailed in Army XXI.

- Intelligence **leaders** must be capable of—
 - Meeting the commander’s need for timely, coherent, and comprehensive understanding of the enemy and the operational environment, to include the cultural and human influences that affect the adversary’s capabilities and actions.
 - Anticipating future requirements and assisting the supported commander in the translation of those operational requirements into the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).
 - Leading and developing subordinate MI soldiers.
- Intelligence **forces** must be capable of—
 - Providing wide area, multispectral surveillance of the battlespace.
 - Aggregating and fusing bottom-up with top-down information and feeding it to brigade and battalion levels.
 - Producing an “in-time” common relevant picture for battlespace visualization and situational awareness.
 - Accurately locating, identifying, and tracking high-payoff targets (HPTs) and conducting battle damage assessment (BDA).
 - Conducting C²W operations.
 - Supporting force protection operations.
 - Assisting in friendly force tracking.
 - Accessing, leveraging, and operating with joint and multinational capabilities.

Current Doctrine

Intelligence XXI is built upon a solid doctrinal foundation which includes the following five principles. While in effect today, these basic principles will apply to Army XXI as well.



The Commander Drives Intelligence. Commanders must understand their intelligence system, along with its capabilities and limitations, as thoroughly as they understand their fire and maneuver systems. This reality demands better, more coherent intelligence training for future battle commanders and warfighter staffs—not just the intelligence officer.

Intelligence Synchronization. Intelligence officers must drive the entire intelligence cycle. They must understand the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence force—national to tactical—as well as those of other reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems, and how they are best integrated into operations.

Split-Based Operations. Intelligence organizations must be flexible and modular, capable of going with the first lift, and be digitally connected in real time to their sanctuary command post. Intelligence forces must be able to maintain dynamic situational awareness, including the conduct of rehearsals enroute. While the specific work of deployed intelligence forces will differ from those in sanctuary, their collective single purpose will be to provide focused, responsive intelligence and maintenance support to the deployed force commander by accessing and leveraging all available resources, national to tactical.

Tactical Tailoring. MI leaders must be able to tailor a balanced intelligence team from both organic and non-organic intelligence resources. The team must be flexible and able to operate in traditional SASO environments. It must also be able to operate with non-organic personnel and equipment. To do this successfully, intelligence leaders must know what is available, how to access it, and how to

incorporate it into the operation. Furthermore, intelligence leaders must structure training to incorporate practice with ad hoc intelligence organizations.

Broadcast Dissemination. The last principle incorporates two significant capabilities: Directed downlink and broadcast of raw data and “smart push” of analyzed intelligence products; and access to intelligence products and databases in a “smart pull” mode. This requires properly trained intelligence teams and leaders who are supported by robust, assured communications connectivity from battalion up. It also requires savvy battle commanders who can effectively visualize and articulate their key information needs. Effective use of broadcast dissemination capabilities thus has substantial training implications, not just for intelligence soldiers and leaders but for the entire warfighting team.

Intelligence XXI Tasks

The Army XXI battlefield requires execution of the following fundamental intelligence tasks:

- Direct.
- Collect.
- Analyze.
- Disseminate.
- Present.
- Attack.
- Protect.

Direct

In Army XXI, intelligence operators will direct, coordinate, and synchronize the full complement of available RISTA assets. To do this, intelligence leaders must have real-time visibility of subordinate and lateral assets to enable dynamic adjustments to collection, target tracking, and “hand-off.” They must also be mentally flexible and proficient at dynamically planning and executing RISTA missions using both the latest technology and human intelligence assets. Most importantly, all of this must be done in complete collaboration with the other members of the warfighter team to satisfy the CCIR.

Regardless of the operational setting, providing the battle commander intelligence—where and when he needs it, and in the context of the overall situation—is the fundamental, nonnegotiable tenet of Intelligence XXI. Thus, it is vital that intelligence tools and training be up to the task. Proficiency—the ability of intelligence units, soldiers, and leaders to deliver under these circumstances—will be the single most important determinant of effective intelligence support to the battle commander.

Collect

Intelligence XXI collectors, both human and technical, will enable commanders to see and sense their extended battlespace. These capabilities will provide commanders the intelligence needed to locate, identify, and track HPTs. The expected end-state in the collection arena is an ability to enable the warfighting team (maneuver, fires, aviation, and intelligence) to thoroughly and dynamically see and sense the battlespace so that it can use the resultant information dominance to conduct successful decisive operations. Once again, the key to ensuring these battlefield effects is highly trained operators and maintainers.

Analyze

Processing, synthesis, and analysis will convert battlespace data and information into useful intelligence for the commander. As the extended battlespace grows and OPTEMPO increases, the ability to rapidly process and analyze data must increase accordingly.

Intelligence analysis will also support information operations by focusing both on collection against the opponent's C⁴I structure, as well as assessing the vulnerability of our own C⁴I operations. Understanding the adversary's decision process will enable an accurate assessment of potential targets and support effective information operations against critical nodes. Intelligence professionals must make the enemy situation come alive for the commander to help him shape the battlespace. To do this, they must understand the operation as well as the capabilities and limitations of intelligence assets supporting the mission.

Disseminate

Army XXI operations will demand an uninterrupted flow of intelligence. The battle commander must be provided data specific to his needs via automatic updates regardless of where he is in this continuum of planning and operations. To do this will require the use of tailored, smart push-pull dissemination and the ability to leverage virtually every available means of communication. It will also require the effective exchange of data between units and systems. While technology will help to satisfy these requirements, the bottom-line measure of effectiveness will be the training state and proficiency of the intelligence unit, soldier, and leader.

Present

The intelligence officer's ability to think and communicate verbally, in writing, and graphically must be by-products of training. Battlefield visualization will be critical to Army XXI operations in all environments. Presenting an accurate, coherent, common picture of the situation which immediately conveys understanding will be fundamental to enabling commanders to achieve information dominance. In all cases, the commander's ability to anticipate difficult decisions, analyze options, and reduce

uncertainty will be directly proportional to his intelligence staff's ability to support him. Successful execution will be the result of highly skilled, trained intelligence soldiers and units.

Attack

Attack consists of applying lethal and non-lethal means on HPTs. It also entails attacking an adversary's decision process to prevent effective command and control (C²) of his forces by denying him information, degrading or interrupting his C² system, or providing him false or distorted information. Attack options may vary from surgical jamming of the frequency spectrum, to intrusion into the adversary's C² systems to manipulate data. A critical component of any C²W attack option is BDA to assess which side has information dominance. Devising a means to conduct both C²W attack and BDA poses significant technical challenges; it also poses tremendous training challenges for the entire warfighting team.


Protect

Protect can be offensive or defensive in nature. **Offensive** protect seeks to reduce the adversary's ability to attack friendly C². **Defensive** protect seeks to reduce friendly vulnerabilities to adversary attack by friendly employment of adequate physical and electronic protection. Protect measures will be incorporated into Army systems as they are developed and fielded. But at the heart of successful protect operations is a need to thoroughly understand the information battlespace.

Clearly, training of the entire warfighting team will be a key to success in this area. In the intelligence BOS, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) analysis will be key enablers, but most critical will be the integration and synchronization of these and similar analytical efforts with the commander's intent and plan.

ARMY TRAINING XXI

Having described the broad concepts of Army XXI and Intelligence XXI, the focus now shifts to training the force. Army Training XXI is the concept for total Army training in the 21st century. Its mission is to develop a strategy for individual through all levels of collective training. Army Training XXI integrates the entire spectrum of Army training programs and provides a strategy to integrate ongoing initiatives into a coherent training system.



The Army Training XXI concept is composed of three distinct, yet overlapping, **campaign plans**. The campaign plans provide a strategic vision and integrated plan for training the Army XXI force. Proponent schools use the vision provided by the campaign plans to develop **Action Plans** which set the azimuth and establish the resources and responsibilities for training within the proponent. This document—**Intelligence Training XXI**—is the MI School’s Action Plan.

Warfighter XXI Campaign Plan

Warfighter XXI is the **unit training** component of Army Training XXI. It focuses on how the Army will train battle staffs and collective tasks. Its goal is to integrate ongoing initiatives and future developmental efforts to produce a coherent, integrated

training system and strategies for the Army XXI force. Strategies are prepared by proponents in the form of Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) which define how table of organization and equipment (TO&E) units train. They also define the resources required to execute the training. The strategies are descriptive in nature and provide the foundation for the trainer to develop a training program. Warfighter XXI includes—

- **The Standard Army Training System (SATS)** SATS is a computer-based training resource management aid that offers both structured and descriptive training guidance to users from company to division.
- **Training Support Package (TSP)** Warfighter TSPs provide structured training templates that offer live, virtual, or constructive collective training events. TSPs assist commanders to execute and evaluate training.

- **Training Aids, Devices, Simulations, and Simulators (TADSS)**TADSS supplement live training, provide mission rehearsal capabilities, and can offset training constraints. When appropriate, future TADSS will be compatible with distributed interactive simulations (DIS); use standard terrain, threat, and icon databases; be embedded in materiel systems; and be used by both the Active Component and Reserve Components.
- **The Standard Army After-Action Review System (STAARS)**TAARS will receive feedback from training exercises and provide a standardized, automated storage, distribution, and retrieval system for after-action reviews (AARs). It will allow commanders to integrate lessons learned into training.
- **The Army Training Digital Library (ATDL)**ATDL is an electronic library that points users, via the Internet or a similar communications medium, to training information stored and maintained electronically in locations throughout the Army. (NOTE: ATDL is a common component of all three campaigns plans.)

Warrior XXI Campaign Plan

Warrior XXI defines future initiatives and activities in the *institutional training* and *self-development* strategies of Army Training XXI. Proponent schools define the requirements for training individual soldiers to standard in resident courses. These Army courses span the individual's career from initial entry training of a new recruit to the Army War College for the Army's senior leaders. The Warrior XXI training environment, Classroom XXI, will use information-age technology to provide training at schools and in units. Training at all levels will focus on developing individual skills and will capitalize on distance learning and DIS initiatives.

Warnet XXI Campaign Plan

The Warnet XXI mission is to ensure that training fully **supports the development of Army XX**by capitalizing on information-age technology and improving interaction among training, combat, and materiel developers. Warnet XXI provides the enablers to fulfill the initiatives of Warfighter XXI and Warrior XXI. Every element of Warnet XXI can be found in either or both of the other two campaign plans. This is especially true in the areas of self-development and distance learning.

- The Warnet XXI goals are to—
 - Strengthen coordination among the combat, materiel, and training developers.
 - Analyze new systems' training support and performance requirements to ensure cost-effective acquisitions and effective training support.

—Develop and provide system TSPs to support system testing and unit, institutional, and Army modernization training needs.

—Integrate Army Modernization Training (AMT)¹ into Classroom XXI and other distance learning infrastructures, where appropriate.

—Provide digitally-formatted, materiel-system² TSPs, and other supporting AMT documentation for the ATDL.

Warnet XXI enables the other two Campaign Plans by serving as the AMT component of Army Training XXI. Warnet XXI also works in concert with the Army acquisition process, combining the efforts of training, combat, and materiel developers. This ensures Army decisionmakers receive essential information upon which to make critical development, production, and training decisions concerning new materiel systems.

¹ Army modernization training includes new equipment training, displaced equipment training, doctrine and tactics training, sustainment training, and unit modernization, deployment, and proponent training.

² Materiel systems include weapon systems, tactical equipment, information systems, and TADDS.

Part Two

Vision, Training Imperatives, and Goals

Part One described the broad concepts that will drive training development for the 21st century. Part Two will describe how the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School must evolve to provide training within the context of those concepts.

VISION - INTELLIGENCE TRAINING XXI

The end-state envisioned for Intelligence Training XXI is the development, implementation, and sustainment of training and an intelligence training system at individual, collective, and institutional levels that will for:

Leaders and Soldiers (Individual)

- Produce a joint information age warrior who is “**Ready Now!**” and who is able to perform across the spectrum of Army XXI missions and operations—technically, tactically, and as a leader.
- Produce combined arms commanders and warfighter staffs who understand U.S. intelligence capabilities—Army, joint, national—and who are proficient in the integrated, synchronized application of the non-lethal combat power afforded by those capabilities across the full range of Army XXI missions and operational settings.

MI Units (Collective)

- Enable MI units to regularly train to proficiency under realistic conditions so that they are “**Ready Now!**”
- Provide effective, integrated, and synchronized non-lethal combat power and support to the combined arms commander and the entire warfighting team across the full spectrum of Army XXI missions, operations, and environments.

Intelligence Center (Institutional)

- Yield a “Schoolhouse Without Walls” that is capable of and committed to seamless support of individual and collective intelligence readiness under realistic conditions across the force, be it in intelligence or combined arms units.
- Yield a “Schoolhouse Without Walls” that is current operationally, technically, and educationally and that is recognized Armywide as a center of excellence

in the areas of distance learning, training simulation, and embedded system training.

TRAINING IMPERATIVES - INTELLIGENCE TRAINING XXI

The implications of Army XXI and Intelligence XXI operations for training the 21st century intelligence force are many and varied. Those implications demand that the Intelligence Center and School establish certain training imperatives and core competencies, and that the imperatives drive all training and training development. The three training imperatives are a ***seamless training architecture, realism, and proficiency***. These training imperatives must be evident in the OPLANs developed to support each of the specific training objectives which will be introduced in Part Three.

Seamless Training Architecture

The effectiveness of training and training development at the Intelligence Center has direct and substantial impact on intelligence training and readiness in the larger force. Therefore, the intelligence training system must recognize both the need to embed realism into intelligence training and the need to demonstrate observed proficiency in the core competencies.

In addition to the demands placed on intelligence training by Army XXI operations are the separate set of requirements placed on the training system by the prevalence of technology in the Intelligence BOS as well the velocity of change associated with that technology. The Intelligence Center must be committed to developing training at a pace that matches that of evolving and emerging technology to provide soldiers and units with the training tools they need.

The result must be a seamless training architecture. The Intelligence Center must develop and maintain a training architecture that provides a seamless connection between individual and collective training, and between training conducted at the Intelligence School and in the field.

Realism

To be "**Ready Now**," the intelligence training system must acknowledge realism as a primary requirement. Intelligence training must replicate reality as much as possible, in terms of both frequency and scope. This requirement is non-negotiable.

Each type of Army XXI operation will demand different training for the intelligence force. In fact, the norm will be that no two deploying forces will look the same. Intelligence professionals must be trained to leverage unique, tailorable processing, communications, collection, and dissemination capabilities; and to operate against various types of threat. The litmus test for good intelligence will be the ability of the intelligence system to satisfy the commander's time, precision, and synchronization

requirements. These factors must be replicated and stressed in realistic training to ensure that the commander's expectations are met.

Proficiency

Army XXI and Intelligence XXI operations require an intelligence force that is truly proficient—one that “can do” versus one that is merely competent and understands only in abstract terms what needs to be done. Intelligence soldiers, leaders, and units must be proficient within the context of the complex, information-based operations described earlier. This will require proficiency in many of the same areas as 20 years ago, but intelligence professionals will have to demonstrate their proficiency under new, more difficult conditions.

To that end, we must devote time, money, and energy to building new **core competencies** and revitalizing the training of other long-standing core competencies. The core competencies envisioned as essential for the future intelligence soldier and leader—the Intelligence Warrior and Intelligence Battle Captain of Army XXI—are as follows:

Be an expert on friendly operations. The nature of Army XXI operations places a premium on information operations, shaping the battlespace, obtaining and maintaining information dominance, and, as noted earlier, concentrating combat power only when and where it is needed. Clearly, synchronizing the efforts of all battlefield operating systems will be critical. So intelligence leaders and soldiers must be as proficient with the operational doctrine as the operators.

Be an expert on the Intelligence BOS. The need to be an expert on collection systems, supporting communications, processors, analysis, and dissemination is nothing new. What is new is that Army XXI operations require that these functions be performed dynamically. This is a significant requirement. The new reality is that intelligence professionals and units are considered proficient only after demonstrating the ability to perform these “old” tasks under the “new” set of Army XXI conditions. Hence, demonstrating proficiency will be a function of realism achieved in training.

Have technological proficiency appropriate to the leader's or soldier's job. Intelligence leaders, soldiers, and units must be proficient in providing relevant, useful information to the battle commander using the technological tools and techniques that have been provided. Every leader and soldier in the Intelligence XXI force must be proficient on the “family” of MI flagship systems and be able to demonstrate an appropriate level of all-source analysis system (ASAS) proficiency. They must also be proficient in accessing and navigating the numerous networks that make up the global or military information environments to get information required by the battle commander; or that must be used or countered in conducting information operations. In short, the training system must train intelligence leaders and operators to access,

leverage, integrate, and synchronize information from higher, lower, adjacent, joint, and multinational sources.

Be a proficient analyst. The essence of effective intelligence is providing timely, relevant, precise analysis that enables coordinated, synchronized battlefield operations. This requires proficiency in synthesizing information, including some information while excluding other; drawing conclusions from what is available; and developing insights from what is not available. Analysts can expect some assistance from the use of artificial intelligence, event alarms, and a myriad of other tools that are embedded into computers. However, we are decades away from being able to reach into the “bit bucket” to get an answer to every question that the battle commander might have. What is required is a pool of analysts who have demonstrated expert skills in critical, creative thinking: analysts who can pull information together into common sense, correct, and relevant bottom-line judgments for the commander. The Army’s intelligence training system for Army XXI must energetically embrace the development of analysts to the same degree devoted to the pursuit of technological proficiency on its systems.

Be a proficient maintainer. While the focus of this discussion about proficiency is on operations, the assured availability of “systems” is fundamental to effective intelligence support to Army XXI operations. Systems that do not work or maintenance personnel who cannot fix broken equipment have the potential to become the Achilles’ heel of Intelligence XXI. Thus, the frequently low profile, skilled maintainer is as critical to Intelligence XXI as is the good analyst.

Maintain proficiency in soldier skills. Although this document deals primarily with the challenge of obtaining individual and collective proficiency in the intelligence arena, soldiers must still maintain their basic soldier skills to be an effective member of the unit. Soldiers who are not fit, for instance, eventually will be a detriment to their unit when called upon to serve in an operational environment.

Continuously seek to be a better leader. MI leaders have a unique challenge. They must understand combat operations as well as intelligence operations. They must work with combined arms commanders and the rest of the warfighter staff to keep current on what they need to know about intelligence to effectively leverage and integrate it into the combined arms operation. They must be technically proficient in areas ranging from automation to communications to maintenance to flight operations to information networks. They must even be proficient at thinking in a way that leads to judgments and analytical bottom lines that influence their commanders’ operational decisions.

In addition to the host of intelligence-unique challenges are the normal leadership duties that face all leaders: leading in the face of ethical and moral dilemmas, troop leading, team building, family support, and the like. Yet, the challenge for MI leaders is worth special mention because of the scope of responsibility and

complexity of operations confronted by junior MI leaders—MI company commanders and S2s; as well as the more senior leaders—battalion and brigade commanders and G2s. In these positions and others as well, effective leadership frequently will spell the difference between success and failure. MI leaders therefore must be innovative; they must anticipate; and they must be able to make things happen.

Perhaps most importantly, MI leaders must be comfortable leading in the face of dramatic technological, system, and organizational changes. While intangible, effective leadership for results is no less a real contributor to mission success than is good PIR from the commander, good communication, or a good database. Seeking results through innovation, striving for improvement, staying on top of change, and conducting realistic training will be particular challenges for the MI leader in the transition to Army XXI.


Implications

Thus, taken collectively, the Army XXI and Intelligence XXI training imperatives as they apply to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center are to—

- Pursue training and training development that has realism as its goal. This will be achieved in various ways, but a single event must be the development of a family of robust, flexible, realistic intelligence simulations that can be employed equally by intelligence soldiers and units at combat training centers (CTCs), battle command training programs (BCTPs), and during more routine training in the schoolhouse and the field.
- Pursue training and training development that results in proficient intelligence units, soldiers, and leaders. This means that training development should be done once: for use in the school and at the unit. To keep pace with changing technology and to make unit and institutional training as mutually supportable as possible, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center must take steps to rapidly prototype training with the assistance of the field, and it must seek to export the resultant products using modern technology. In effect, the Center must champion and become a center of excellence for distance learning, system-embedded training, and other related initiatives. These efforts will have the combined effect of creating seamless training between the schoolhouse and the MI unit in the field.
- Reengineer the Intelligence School to better enable training and training development as described above.

GOALS - INTELLIGENCE TRAINING XXI

The **Intelligence Training XXVision** drew from Army XXI, Intelligence XXI, and Army Training XXI discussed in Part One. The **Vision** described the desired end-state for development, implementation, and sustainment of intelligence training throughout the force. The **Training Imperatives** established training development principles and core competencies that must be integral parts of all training development and outcomes.



The over-arching **Goals** of the Intelligence Training XXI effort complement the Intelligence Training XXI **Vision** and **Training Imperatives**. They set the immediate course for accomplishing the intended training outcomes of Army XXI, Intelligence XXI, and Army Training XXI. Each goal and its objectives will be restated in Part Three.

Goal 1:

Construct training and a training environment which will produce joint Information Age Warriors — Intelligence Leaders of the 21st century.

Goal 2:

Develop an MI “Schoolhouse Without Walls” to facilitate seamless training between the school and the field.

Goal 3:

Develop, field, and sustain flexible, realistic, and robust intelligence training materials, simulations, and devices.

Goal 4:

Improve intelligence training provided to combined arms soldiers, staffs, and commanders.

Part Three Objectives

Part Three is divided into four sections. Each section presents an Intelligence Training XXI goal and its subordinate objectives. The objectives are presented in the following format:

Objective

Responsible Organizations (Lead and Assist)

Intent and Scope

Tasks (Intent is provided if required)

Subtasks (Intent is provided if required)

Priorities (If required)

Each objective requires the lead organization to produce an OPLAN. The OPLAN will detail the plan to complete the assigned objective, including all specified and implied tasks. It must also include a timeline and the required resources. **Lead organizations are required to complete development of their OPLANs within 90 days of this Action Plan's publication date.**

Upon approval by the Deputy Commanding General, OPLANs will be appended to this Action Plan.

Goal 1. Construct training and a training environment which will produce Joint Information Age Warriors—Intelligence Leaders of the 21st century.

Objective 1.1: Revise, update, and improve individual intelligence training strategies for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) to enable continuous professional development from service entry to retirement.

Objective 1.2: Develop and distribute training which will teach the MI Joint Information Age Warrior and Battle Captain how to conduct intelligence operations in a family of networks.

Objective 1.3: Develop a family of descriptive MI unit training strategies in support of Warfighter XXI.

Objective 1.4: Improve mission-based training at the Intelligence School by developing and implementing a structured family of exercises rooted in Army XXI doctrine, organization, and expected scenarios.

Objective 1.5: Develop and implement training which will teach intelligence leaders and soldiers to conduct threat analysis and to develop intelligence estimates based on the full spectrum of threats which Army XXI may face.

Objective 1.1: Revise, update, and improve individual intelligence training strategies for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) to enable continuous professional development from service entry to retirement.

Responsibility

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, DAC, NCOA, RC Advisor, TSMs, DCD, OCMI, CAC, DCST, ATSC, USASGMA, USAR, USNGB, DIA, NSA

Intent and Scope Update (and develop where they currently do not exist) individual training strategies and programs of instruction for both the AC and the RC in accordance with the Total Army Training System (TATS). Address individual training that is conducted both at the Intelligence School and in the unit. As a critical output, define the strategies for officer, warrant officer, and NCO self-development. The implementation of TATS will ensure AC and RC training is as seamless as possible, with differences being eliminated wherever possible.

Task 1.1.1: Conduct a mission analysis of intelligence tasks to be performed by intelligence leaders, soldiers, and units. The results of the analysis must also provide a coherent strategy for migrating to Army XXI training as capabilities become available. It will also serve as a baseline for use in the development of other OPLANs.

Subtask 1.1.1a: Use the A-series TO&E as the baseline for this analysis.

Intent: The results of this analysis will be used to develop and refine current training requirements.

Subtask 1.1.1b: Use the Army XXI TO&E as the baseline for this analysis.

Intent: The results of this analysis will be used to develop future training requirements.

Task 1.1.2: Conduct a comprehensive review of MI career track training.

Intent: Determine what intelligence personnel should be able to do, what training is required to ensure that they can do it, and when and where the training should be conducted. It is key that the results of this task describe the operational setting expected for the performance of critical MI missions.

Subtask 1.1.2a: Develop concise written statements of what MI enlisted, warrant officer, and officer personnel are expected to be able to do, and under what general conditions, at each grade level throughout their career.

Intent: This work, to be effective, must be the capstone product that enables coherence in training across career fields and that serves as guidance for the development of training within these career fields.

Subtask 1.1.2b: Conduct Critical Task Site Selection Boards (CTSSBs) for each military occupational specialty (MOS) or Area of Concentration (AOC).

Intent: Clearly identify what, when, and where training will be accomplished during an individual's career. An added dimension to CTSSBs conducted upon implementation of this plan will be to specify not just tasks to be trained, but essential conditions to be present for selected tasks; i.e., the CTSSBs will document the logical progression from the "mission analysis" (Task 1.1.1) to the "statements of what MI personnel are expected to be able to do" (Task 1.1.2a) to the CTSSBs.

Subtask 1.1.2c: Identify where skills should be taught that will not be taught at the school.

Subtask 1.1.2d: Identify what intelligence skills should be taught to MI majors and lieutenant colonels and provide a strategy for doing it (at Command and General Staff College [CGSC], through distance learning, and so forth).

Task 1.1.3: Develop training plans which will implement the findings of Task 1.1.2 above. Articulate what the Intelligence Center will do to enable the desired end state. (See Priorities at the end of this Objective.)

Intent: In pursuing redesigned individual training plans, the intent is to optimize training from the perspective of the career track, not from the perspective of a specific course. No course will increase in length. Where the above might put the need for more technical training into conflict with TRADOC-defined requirements to conduct Army common training, develop the training strategy to minimize Army common training in the school; identify where the trade-offs are proposed so that resultant issues may be addressed and resolved.

The resulting plans must plug gaps, eliminate discontinuities, and minimize inappropriate redundancy. They must also provide a flexible, modular strategy for the anticipated introduction of new systems, software, and thinking.

Leverage new technology in the revised training strategies. Minimize instructor-to-student contact in the lecture mode, increase student self-paced instruction, increase distance learning, increase embedded training, and use appropriate surrogates for hands-on instruction for more senior personnel.

Task 1.1.4: Develop and implement RC training which incorporates the tenets of the TATS Course Implementation Guidelines and creates a seamless AC and RC training environment.

Subtask 1.1.4a: Develop TATS courses and accompanying transition strategies.

Intent: The information derived from the analysis conducted in Task 1.1.1 will be used to develop these courses. Articulate alternative training for those courses which cannot be converted to exportable TATS courses. TATS courses will reduce (or eliminate when possible) the requirement for resident training via nonresident means.

Subtask 1.1.4b: Develop a partnership with a selected RC unit to experiment with distance learning initiatives.

Intent: Continue to promote mutually supportive AC and RC MI training relationships. Develop a professional development program for RC staffs and instructor cadres. Ensure the unit is linked into the Intelligence Center's proponent network (PRONET). Use lessons learned from the prototype distance learning and exportable training to improve training to the total force.

Priorities: While re-engineering of our MOS training strategy and force structure is to give maximum consideration to improving MI technical training, this must be accomplished without diminishing leader development. Officer and NCO programs must continue to produce leaders who can successfully lead and command in a Force XXI Army.

Enlisted (in this order):

CMF 96: Re-engineer CMF 96 with the focus of MOS 96B as the flagship analytical MOS. Structure 96B training around analytical thinking and ASAS proficiency and being able to perform effectively while working in a corps ACE through a battalion S2 shop on a Force XXI battlefield.

CMF 98: Re-engineer CMF 98 and corresponding MOS training strategies to account for the new global communications environment and the challenges of information warfare.

CMF 33: Re-engineer CMF 33 to ensure that it keeps pace with rapidly changing electronic maintenance requirements of Force XXI.

Warrant officer:

Examine each linked military occupational specialty code for corresponding restructure actions. Follow the same priorities as above for enlisted.

Officer (in this order):

35D: Develop training to produce brigade and battalion S2s and ACE Battle Captains who will function successfully in joint and combined organizations.

35E: Develop training to produce an MDCI officer who can effectively perform in an Army XXI information operations (IO) environment at division, corps, and joint task force (JTF) levels.

35G: Examine 35G training strategy to account for the new global communications environment and the challenges of information warfare.

35C: Examine 35C training strategy to account for technological developments and improved imaging capabilities.

All: Develop a training plan to keep MI officers proficient in the BOS after the MI Officers Advanced Course (MIOAC). This will include self-development training.

Objective 1.2: Develop and distribute training which will teach the MI Joint Information Age Warrior and Battle Captain how to conduct intelligence operations in a family of networks.

Responsibility:

Lead: BDE

Assist: DOTD, DCD, TSMs, NCOA, CAC, Signal School, INSCOM, DIA, NSA

Intent and Scope: Effective intelligence operations in support of Army XXI will rely heavily on how well information from every possible source is leveraged at the S2, G2, or J2 level. Possible information sources will include local area networks (LANs), Army information systems (covering all BOS), other service, joint, national, non-DOD, non-government organizations, as well as commercial and foreign information systems and databases. Joint Information Warriors and Battle Captains must understand the accessibility, range, and capabilities of information systems ranging from the tactical to multinational levels.

Task 1.2.1: Develop and implement a plan to teach mission specific system networking to MI units and soldiers.

Intent: Training will teach MI leaders and soldiers to access information from systems and databases at levels ranging from tactical to multinational in support of missions which might be executed on a contingency basis.

Subtask 1.2.1a: Embed instruction into MIOAC, Officer Basic Course, Warrant Officer Advanced Course, and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer's Course (ANCOC) which culminates with a capstone exercise testing individual proficiency in accessing information systems and databases at levels ranging from tactical to multinational.

Subtask 1.2.1b: Develop and implement (via electronic media) network training which teaches availability of and methods for accessing information systems and databases at levels ranging from tactical to multinational.

Task 1.2.2: Embed network training into ASAS training for use at the Intelligence School and for export to field units through rapid prototyping.

Intent: Information gained from organic assets must be merged with information available through other exploitable information systems and databases in order to provide the best possible intelligence support to Army XXI. Embedding network training with ASAS training will promote this.

Subtask 1.2.2a: Design, develop, and implement network training into ASAS which will enable proficiency at technical and leader levels for the school.

Subtask 1.2.2b: Design, develop, and disseminate (or implement) a series of mutually supportive training modules which may be embedded into ASAS at the school and in the field.

Objective 1.3: Develop a family of descriptive MI unit training strategies in support of Warfighter XXI.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, NCOA, BCBL(H), DCD, CAC, DCST, ATSC, INSCOM, FORSCOM, USAREUR

Intent and Scope The CATS is the foundation of the structured training development for Warfighter XXI. CATS provides the overarching strategy for training management; sets the direction for how the force trains; and identifies the best mix of training resources to execute the training. Military Intelligence Combat Assessment Tables

(MICATs) provide seamless training between the unit and the Intelligence School, while providing a commander the means of assessing training and combat readiness. MICATs will provide the total intelligence force with standardized guidance on how MI units should train to achieve collective proficiency on mission-essential tasks and what they must do to qualify annually as combat ready. Available to units through electronic media, a commander will use the initiatives of Warfighter XXI, Warrior XXI, and Warnet XXI to build an effective unit training program.

MICATs will provide the foundation for training, combat, and materiel developers to develop embedded training, simulators, and simulations while unit training strategies will identify other resources required to execute training.

Task 1.3.1: Design and build products which train the planning, preparation, and execution of intelligence battle command and staff functions (including individual through collective tasks) for export via electronic media.

Intent: Products will factor in the use of ASAS and will be based on a major regional conflict threat on an Army XXI battlefield. Use the Warfighter XXI Training Strategy as a reference.

Subtask 1.3.1a: Develop a training strategy for division-level MI organizations including the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), the G2 staff, and the general support (GS) MI Company.

Subtask 1.3.1b: Develop a training strategy for brigade and below level MI organizations including the brigade S2 staff, the battalion S2 staff, analysis and control teams (ACTs), and the direct support (DS) MI Company.

Subtask 1.3.1c: Develop a training strategy for corps level MI organizations including the G2 staff and the ACE.

Objective 1.4: Improve mission-based training at the Intelligence School by developing and implementing a structured family of exercises rooted in Army XXI doctrine, organization, and expected scenarios.

Responsibility:

Lead: BDE

Assist: DOTD, NCOA, CAC, ATSC, CTCs, INSCOM

Intent and Scope: Make training as realistic as possible. Training will be more effective when students are required to perform in the context of missions which they will execute after leaving the sterile environment of the classroom. Intelligence XXI

training must teach MI leaders and soldiers the requirements and demands of their jobs—not what to think, but how to think. To prepare MI leaders and soldiers and to operate under a confluence of demanding real world conditions, we must train in a fast-changing environment. Embed as much training as possible into situation-based exercises including both conventional and SASO scenarios with MI leaders and soldiers supporting from brigade, division (including ACE), and DS company levels.

Task 1.4.1: Develop a coordinated family of shared training exercises (integrating students from different courses into single exercises) and more robust single-course exercises and mission-based practical exercises (PEs). Make MIOAC the flagship of this effort.

Intent: Students must perform missions in the context of conditions expected on the Army XXI battlefield. For example: Require that intelligence support be provided in the context of force projection and associated force packaging; that students operate with other service intelligence capabilities; that they leverage national intelligence capabilities (collectors, databases); and that they access non-organic, non-Army, non-DOD, and non-U.S. information and data.

Students must be realistically challenged to provide timely, precision support to targeting, BDA, and tactical decisionmaking. Exercises must replicate content, challenge, and intensity of current CTC rotations and BCTP warfighters. Operational scenarios must confront students with the realities of system reliability, availability, and maintainability which adversely affect mission performance.

Subtask 1.4.1a: Develop and implement an MIOAC specific exercise which prepares the student to operate as a brigade S2, as a DS company commander, and as an ACE Battle Captain in a major regional conflict (traditional military threat) setting.

Subtask 1.4.1b: Develop and implement an MIOAC specific exercise which requires the student to operate in support of a J2 in a forward deployed, brigade level (JTF) in a SASO environment.

Subtask 1.4.1c: Develop and implement a capstone exercise which integrates students from all courses into an exercise which ranges throughout the continuum of military contingency operations.

Objective 1.5: Develop and implement training which will teach intelligence leaders and soldiers to conduct threat analysis and to develop intelligence estimates based on the full spectrum of threats which Army XXI may face.

Responsibility:

Lead: BDE

Assist: DOTD, DCD, NCOA, CAC, TRADOC DCSINT, DA DCSINT, NSA, DIA

Intent and Scope MI leaders and soldiers must conduct effective threat analysis and estimate development against the full spectrum of anticipated Army XXI threats ranging from highly structured, modernized military forces in a conventional scenario to loosely structured factions in SASO. Successful training will enable MI leaders and soldiers to—

- Present a common picture of the battlefield to the supported commander allowing him to visualize the entire battlespace.
- Orally communicate salient issues.

Task 1.5.1: Integrate threat analysis and estimation training based on Army XXI scenarios into all officer and NCO courses.

Task 1.5.2: Develop and implement threat analysis and estimation training for the entire force via distance learning.

Goal 2. Develop an MI “Schoolhouse Without Walls” to facilitate seamless training between the school and the field.

Objective 2.1: Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of a modern communications and information infrastructure that will enable the integration of field units into an interactive training development, doctrinal, and realistic training environment for the Army XXI intelligence force.

Objective 2.2: Re-engineer the Intelligence Center and School to support Army XXI training requirements.

Objective 2.3: Refine (and develop where they do not exist) the System Training Plan (STRAP) training strategies for MI flagship systems.

Objective 2.4: Develop Individual TSPs for all common tasks for which MI is the proponent, in support of the Army Training Support Center’s (ATSC) effort to convert all Army common training to distance learning.

Objective 2.1: Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of a modern communications and information infrastructure that will enable the integration of field units into an interactive training development, doctrinal, and realistic training environment for the Army XXI intelligence force.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, DCD, NCOA, BCBL(H), DOIM, TSMs, ASC, ATSC, DCST, DCSDOC, HQ DA DCSC⁴, DIA, NSA

Intent and Scope: This objective supports strategies of Classroom XXI and provides some of the enablers to implement distance learning. While it does not encompass all distance learning initiatives, it does focus on technological enablers to speed up the process of training development and doctrine; and making training products, simulation data streams, and lessons learned easily and readily available throughout the MI force.

Task 2.1.1: Electronically connect all intelligence training organizations.

Subtask 2.1.1a: Create and maintain a network which connects all intelligence training organizations on Fort Huachuca to each other and to wider intelligence and operational communities.

Subtask 2.1.1b: Establish, operate, and maintain external communication connections to external communities.

Subtask 2.1.1c Ensure all personnel in intelligence training organizations on Fort Huachuca have electronic mail accounts using a standard modern application program.

Subtask 2.1.1d: Establish, operate, and maintain a Fort Huachuca information architecture (training Intranet) to facilitate local sharing of training information.

Subtask 2.1.1e: Establish, operate, and maintain a Fort Huachuca information architecture to make the various networks available to outside users (INTELINK, PRONET, Internet, etc.)

Task 2.1.2: Develop an implementation plan to electronically obtain timely, comprehensive feedback on Intelligence Center training, training development, and training support from field units, CTCs, the RC, and other TRADOC schools. Where possible, incorporate a feedback capability into our exportable, embedded, and distance learning efforts.

Task 2.1.3: Design and implement a proponent network (PRONET).

Intent: Develop a PRONET which is managed at Fort Huachuca. It must provide a means for individuals and units, at the school and in the field, to access and search databases; access and post information to online bulletin boards; and to “chat” with other users in real time. PRONET will enable intelligence professionals to access lessons learned by others. It must provide access to classified and unclassified information. PRONET will augment, but not replace, INTELINK, LINK33, and other existing online initiatives.

Task 2.1.4: Provide computer access to each officer, NCOA, and selected Advanced Individual Training (AIT) students at the school. Make available to all students access to unclassified computer networks.

Subtask 2.1.4a: Develop training to enable students and units to access and use INTELINK. Make the training products exportable to units in the field.

Subtask 2.1.4b: Develop training to enable students and units to access and use PRONET. Make the training products exportable to units in the field.

Task 2.1.5: Design, establish, operate and maintain infrastructure to sustain MI CATTs architecture with Fort Huachuca as the hub for simulation training data.

Intent: Develop the infrastructure to implement IEWTPT as envisioned by the ORD to include those support products required to train and evaluate field units.

Objective 2.2: *Re-engineer the Intelligence Center and School to support Army XXI training requirements.*

Responsibility:

Lead: DAC

Assist: All (USAIC&FH), CAC, DCST

Intent and Scope: Implementing the other Objectives in this plan will require the Intelligence Center and School to move into the 21st century in terms of organizational, physical, and information structures. This mandates a complete, detailed assessment of our organizations and the functions they perform in order to adjust to the realities of the required changes. We must transition into a structure that physically and intellectually supports where we are headed in terms of both training and resources.

The re-engineering effort should eliminate redundancies and create efficiencies throughout the Center and School. The effort may result in the re-designing or even elimination of some functions and organizations. The DAC may employ an outside source (government or contractor) to complete this Objective.

Task 2.2.1: Evaluate the current organization and functions of the Intelligence Center and School and their subordinate organizations. Use the findings of the evaluation to develop models of the proposed, re-engineered Center and School.

Subtask 2.2.1a: Develop one set of objective models which can be implemented under current (FY97) resourcing levels.

Subtask 2.2.1b: Develop one set of objective models which can be implemented under a 10 percent decrement from current resourcing levels.

Task 2.2.2: Evaluate the proposed models. Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the models to determine which model will best satisfy the requirements of this Action Plan given available resources. Develop an executable plan, for execution in FY98, to re-engineer the Center and School according to the selected model.

Subtask 2.2.2a: Identify all resourcing requirements associated with the implementation plan and prepare the required input to the Command Operating Budget.

Subtask 2.2.2b: On order, develop an executable plan to transition from a model at current resourcing levels to a model at resourcing levels that are decremented by 10 percent from current levels.

Objective 2.3: Refine (and develop where they do not exist) the System Training Plan (STRAP) training strategies for MI flagship systems.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE TSMs, DCD, NCOA, ATSC, DCST, AMC (PMs), MACOMs, ASPO, HQDA DCSINT, HQDA DCSOPS, DIA, NSA

Intent and Scope: Develop a laydown of how each MI flagship system will be trained at the school and in the unit. Each plan will describe the system's function, capabilities, and strategy to train leaders and soldiers at every level from soldier, to operator

soldier, to system integrator (leader). Successful completion of this objective will provide seamless training between the institution, the individual, and the unit through resident instruction, embedded training, and distance learning.

Task 2.3.1: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for ASAS.

Intent: The plan will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom the tasks must be trained (by grade and MOS or area of concentration [AOC]).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).
- Describe the context within which the training must occur. For ASAS training to be effective, it is essential that it be more than “button pushing.” It must treat the issue of how the machine (ASAS) supports the process — the timely production of intelligence for the supported commander.

Subtask 2.3.1a: Complete training products and implement training within 90 days of the date of this document; much of the work for ASAS has already been completed.

Task 2.3.2: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for TROJAN SPIRIT.

Intent: The training will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom they must be trained (by grade and MOS or AOC).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).

Task 2.3.3: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for the ground station module (GSM) and ground control station (GCS) (prototype).

Intent: The training will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom they must be trained (by grade and MOS or AOC).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).

Task 2.3.4: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

Intent: The training will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom they must be trained (by grade and MOS or AOC).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).

Task 2.3.5: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for the ground-based common sensor.

Intent: The training will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom they must be trained (by grade and MOS or AOC).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).

Task 2.3.6: Develop a training strategy and implementation plan — including a schedule for the delivery of training products — for the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and the Forward Area Support Terminal (FAST).

Intent: The training will—

- Identify which tasks must be trained and under what conditions (including justification for why they must be trained).
- Identify to whom they must be trained (by grade and MOS or AOC).
- Recommend the best method for completing the training (both locally and through distance learning).

Objective 2.4: Develop Individual TSPs for all common tasks for which MI is the proponent, in support of the Army Training Support Center's (ATSC) effort to convert all Army common training to distance learning.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, NCOA, ATSC

Intent and Scope: Reliance on exportable common training will increase as availability of funds for resident training decreases. Thoroughly developed MI Army common tasks will be essential to ensuring leaders and soldiers from all branches are aware of our mission and the products we produce to help them complete theirs.

Task 2.4.1: Develop TSPs for the seven individual Army common tasks for which MI is the proponent:

- Report Intelligence Information (301-371-1000).
- Implement Operations Security Measures (301-371-1050).
- Enforce Personnel Security Policies (301-371-1051).
- Protect Classified Information and Material (301-371-1052).
- Integrate IPB Process Into Mission Planning (301-371-1100).
- Employ Indications and Warnings Warfare Assets (301-371-1150).
- Process Captured Material (301-371-1200).

Goal 3. Develop, field, and sustain flexible, realistic, and robust intelligence training materials, simulations, and devices.

Objective 3.1: Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of an MI simulations architecture that will enable realistic, high fidelity training of the Army XXI intelligence force.

Objective 3.2: Review and revise the Intelligence Center's Doctrinal Literature Program.

Objective 3.3: Develop TTP and related training products to support Force XXI intelligence training.

Objective 3.4: Develop a comprehensive, coherent, revitalized MI language sustainment training strategy in support of Army XXI.

Objective 3.1: Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of an MI simulations architecture that will enable realistic, high fidelity training of the Army XXI intelligence force.

Responsibility:

Lead: ATD

Assist: DOTD, BCBL(H), DCD, TSMs, DOIM, CAC, ATSC, TRADOC Schools, DCST, HQDA DCSINT, HQDA DCSOPS, AMC, STRICOM, DIA, NSA

Intent and Scope. Command in modern war is a complex and intellectually demanding task. The U.S. comparative advantage is the ability to simultaneously strike in multiple locations using precision munitions. Key to effective battle command is speedy acquisition of information, conversion of information to a common “read” of the battlespace and rapid decisions. Speed is required to keep pace with change in the battle and to permit time for subordinate commanders and staffs to synchronize the force. Facilitating battle command and battle command training should be MI's highest priority.

Modern reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (RISTA) systems, combined with emerging innovative visualization on Army Battle Command Systems (for example, Maneuver Control System or ASAS), are central to situation awareness and deep targeting. Visualization can be very efficient in displaying information, but using modern visualization techniques is an acquired skill. For a commander to assess operational risk and synchronize forces requires seeing the whole of a unit's RISTA effort before making RISTA resource and operational decisions. MI personnel must train with modern visual systems to effectively facilitate commanding the force in the current and future battle.

The desired end-state for training the intelligence force is a family of simulations that are able to drive school, unit-based, BCTP, and CTC training with high fidelity, realistic visual and text simulations. Intelligence leader, soldier, and unit access to quality simulations must not be limited to major training events. The simulations must be available for routine use at the Intelligence Center and in the unit. They must also be available for BCTP and CTC exercises, as well as during unit preparation prior to exercises.

Simulations and simulators must confront intelligence soldiers and units with relevant information that approximates the volume and type of information that will be encountered in operations. Pursue the development of common embedded scenarios that can be varied to approximate the different operational settings expected on the Army XXI battlefield. The set of simulations and simulators must be compatible and integrated with existing and envisioned Army training simulations, as described in Warnet XXI.

Task 3.1.1: Articulate a coherent, comprehensive set of requirements for simulations, simulators, and models to support total MI force training. Use the initiatives identified in the FIRESTORM Strategy (Federation of Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting, Operations and Research Models) as a start point for this effort. Coordinate this action with the National Simulations Center.

Task 3.1.2: Gain TRADOC and Army programmatic and development support. Incorporate the resultant simulations requirements into Warfighter Lens Analysis, Functional Area Assessments, and Training Management and Administration actions.

Task 3.1.3: Gain Army support to begin formal acquisition development of a single simulation architecture for training in FY98.

Task 3.1.4: Gain Joint and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) support for the technology that underlies MI's single architecture for training, with the objective of inserting that technology into emerging JSIMS developments.

Task 3.1.5: When the simulation technology is sufficiently mature, move to rapidly insert it into BCTP and other Army leader training opportunities NLT 4th Quarter FY97.

Objective 3.2: Review and revise the Intelligence Center's Doctrinal Literature Program.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, NCOA, DCD, TSMs, CAC, ATSC, DCSDOC, INSCOM,
HQDA DCSINT

Intent and Scope: Review the existing infrastructure and resume commitment to develop MI doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Revise the program to reduce the amount of doctrinal products to meet the needs of Army XXI. Link the hierarchy of Joint-Army-MI doctrinal publications to related unit training support material.

Task 3.2.1: Develop a one-page visual that shows the linkage of current and projected Joint-Army-MI doctrinal publications.

Task 3.2.2: Reassess the structure and priorities of the Doctrinal Literature Program. Develop an updated production schedule that covers doctrinal publications over the next 5 years.

Objective 3.3: Develop TTP and related training products to support Force XXI intelligence training.

Responsibility:

Lead: BCBL(H)

Assist: BDE, DOTD, DCD, TSMs, CAC, DCST, ATSC, DCSCD, TRADOC Schools, HQDA DCSINT, INSCOM, FORSCOM

Intent and Scope: The Army, through its Battle Lab and Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) initiatives, is developing Army XXI and associated doctrine, in part, through a process of experimentation. Specifically, Division XXI concerns development at division level and below, while Task Force XXI concerns development at brigade level and below. This Objective ensures that AWE forces are optimally trained, work in a proactive, collaborative manner with the Experimental Force to develop and field TTP and related training support that reflects the Intelligence Center's best effort and thinking. Include senior MI leader review and wargaming prior to issuing the products.

Task 3.3.1: Produce TTP, TSP, and crew drills to support Task Force XXI.

Task 3.3.2: Produce TTP, TSP, and crew drills to support Division XXI.

Objective 3.4: Develop a comprehensive, coherent, revitalized MI language sustainment training strategy in support of Army XXI.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, OCMi, DCD, NCOA, CAC, DLI, DCST, ATSC, HQDA DCSOPS, HQDA DCSINT, INSCOM, FORSCOM

Intent and Scope: The language training strategy must comprehensively attack the problem of how to sustain and, over time, increase the proficiency of MI linguists.

Task 3.4.1: Develop a language training career map tied to increasing proficiency standards for each linguist as he or she advances through each MOS skill level.

Intent: Linguists must improve their perishable skills continuously. Separate languages will require differing amounts of work to attain increased levels of proficiency. Articulate responsibilities of the Defense Language Institute (DLI), unit, and the individual in attaining and maintaining language skills. Address the problem of students graduating from the DLI without the language skills required to meet the minimum standards attached to their MOS skill level. Provide options for incorporating computer-based, self-paced instruction and changes to distance learning, along with refresher and immersion training into unit and individual training programs. Upon approval, language training career maps will be included in Army XXI Intelligence Manning Documents, AR 611-6, and AR 611-201.

Task 3.4.2: Develop evaluation tools which evaluate the abilities of linguists to perform in the context of realistic mission-based settings.

Intent: Current Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPTs) issued in the field test only listening and reading skills. Many MI soldiers must speak in their target language in order to effectively complete the assigned mission. Revise DLPTs to test speaking for all non-SIGINT MOSs. Ensure DLPTs are based on vocabulary that is related to missions which might be executed by leaders and soldiers.

Task 3.4.3: Develop a concept for a structured experiment which will identify the best way, or combination of ways, to train linguists to language proficiency.

Intent: The experiment should test alternatives to the current language school system and evaluate possible benefits of each. For example, consider the use of current DLI training as an initial baseline which is supplemented by contract training (for example, Berlitz) and/or onsite immersion training.

Task 3.4.4: Recommend changes to unit status reports (USRs) (AR 220-1) to reflect the readiness of linguists in each reporting organization.

Intent: Language is a “weapon system” for MI leaders and soldiers. Without proficient linguists, a unit may not be able to satisfactorily complete its wartime mission. Standardizing the USR with respect to language readiness in MI units will sharpen the training picture presented to decisionmakers.

Goal 4. Improve intelligence training provided to combined arms soldiers, staffs, and commanders.

Objective 4.1: Ensure Intelligence School instructors possess the required expertise to qualify as subject matter experts.

Objective 4.2: Improve intelligence training in combined arms training centers and activities.

Objective 4.3: Export standardized MI training to develop combined arms leaders who understand the employment and capabilities of the Intelligence BOS.

Objective 4.1: Ensure Intelligence School instructors possess the required expertise to qualify as subject matter experts.

Responsibility:

Lead: BDE

Assist: DOTD, OCMI, NCOA, DAC, DHR, ATSC, DCST, CTCs, PERSCOM

Intent and scope: Training at the Intelligence Center must focus on MI operations at echelons corps and below. Instructors at USAIC&FH must represent the best we have to offer. Often, our instructors are subject matter experts in specific areas, but possess limited practical experience with overall MI functions at ECB. We must seek out instructors with a broad base of MI experience.

Task 4.1.1: Ensure MI Project Warrior participants are assigned to Fort Huachuca after completing tours at CTCs. Further, ensure these officers serve as instructors for a minimum of 18 months after arrival.

Task 4.1.2: Develop and implement a program which ensures MI NCOs serving at CTCs receive follow-on assignments to USAIC&FH to serve as instructors.

Intent: Develop a system for ensuring CTC-experienced NCOs are assigned to USAIC&FH on a recurring basis. In the interim, seek NCOs at the CTCs who are pending permanent change of station for reassignment to USAIC&FH.

Task 4.1.3: Ensure all non-Project Warrior instructors at USAIC&FH complete one rotation at a CTC as an augmentee observer controller (O/C) or “right seat rider” prior to assuming instructor duties.

Task 4.1.4: Ensure all instructors complete a certification program in accordance with TRADOC Regulation 351-XX (TASS).

Intent: The certification program will assess both mastery of tasks and supporting objectives as well as the ability to train course objectives.

Objective 4.2: Improve intelligence training in combined arms training centers and activities.

Responsibility:

Lead: BCBL(H)

Assist: BDE, DOTD, NCOA, DCD, CAC, ATSC, DCST, CTCs, HQDA DCSOPS

Intent and scope: The CTCs (and BCTP) are the closest simulation we have to committing forces (and staffs) to combat. The availability of intelligence support to the commander must replicate what would exist in combat.

Task 4.2.1: Develop and implement a structured simulations architecture which will integrate live, virtual, and constructive simulations to train force projection units in a high resolution information environment at the National Training Center (NTC).

Task 4.2.2: Develop and implement a structured simulations architecture which will integrate live, virtual, and constructive simulations to train force projection units in a high resolution information environment at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

Task 4.2.3: Develop and implement a structured simulations architecture which will integrate live, virtual, and constructive simulations to train force projection units in a high resolution information environment at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).

Task 4.2.4: Develop and implement a high resolution information environment to drive BCTP Warfighters.

Intent: Enable battle commanders to confront realistic intelligence during the exercises which will require them to fully integrate their intelligence effort with other BOSs.

Objective 4.3: Export standardized MI training to develop combined arms leaders who understand the employment and capabilities of the Intelligence BOS.

Responsibility:

Lead: DOTD

Assist: BDE, NCOA, DCD, BCBL(H), TSMs, CAC, ATSC, DCST, TRADOC Schools, HQDA DCSINT

Intent and scope: Poor understanding and use of intelligence assets by combined arms commanders is a major source of poor intelligence performance at the tactical level. Commanders fail to properly use intelligence assets because they do not understand the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence BOS. We must improve the training we provide to combined arms commanders. Further, we must ensure MI leaders can convey the capabilities of their systems and personnel to the commander to correct this.

Task 4.3.1: Develop a standardized training module for export to combat arms officer advanced courses (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense) and for the NCO Battlestaff Course which emphasizes the intelligence products a company commander or brigade or battalion staff officer will need to effectively plan and execute missions.

Intent: Improving the use of intelligence assets requires battalion and brigade level combined arms staff officers to know the fundamental MI products they require to effectively plan. Ensuring company grade officers possess solid grounding will allow their understanding of the Intelligence BOS to grow incrementally with their levels of responsibility.

Task 4.3.2: Develop a standardized training module for export to Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, which emphasizes the intelligence products a division and corps level staff officer will need to effectively plan and execute missions.

Intent: CGSC will be the first intensive formal instruction on combined arms operations for many officers. Although there are several MI officers in each class, not all future leaders in combat arms, combat support, and combat service support branches understand the functions of tactical MI. Developing a standardized training module for export to CGSC will help to solve this.

Task 4.3.3: Develop specific standardized training modules for export to each combat arms officer pre-command course (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense) which emphasize the intelligence assets the commander should

expect to have supporting him; the information these assets may obtain; and the products the S2 should support him with.

Intent: Battalion and brigade level combined arms commanders will properly employ intelligence assets if they understand the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence BOS. Formal instruction during pre-command courses will ensure they are trained.

Glossary

AC	Active Component	JTF	joint task force
ACE	analysis and control element		
ACT	analysis and control team	LAN	local area network
AOC	area of concentration		
ANCOC	Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course	MIOAC	Military Intelligence Officer's Advanced Course
ARNG	Army National Guard	MOS	military occupational specialty
ASAS	all-source analysis system		
		NCO	noncommissioned officer
BCBL(H)	Battle Command, Battle Lab (Huachuca)	NCOA	Noncommissioned Officer Academy
BCTP	battle command training program		
BDA	battle damage assessment	OCMI	Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence
bde	brigade	OPLAN	operations plan
BOS	battlefield operating system		
		PRONET	proponent network (web site)
C ² W	command and control warfare		
C ⁴ I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence	RC	Reserve Component
CATS	combined arms training strategies	SASO	stability and support operations
		STRAP	systems training plan
CGSC	Command and General Staff College		
CTC	Combat Training Center	TATS	Total Army Training System
CTSSB	Critical Task Site Selection Board		
		TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
DOTD	Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine	TO&E	table of organization and equipment
DS	direct support	TSP	training support package
HPT	high-payoff target		
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield		

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QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Army XXI Patterns of Operations	INTEL XXI Doctrinal Foundation	Intelligence XXI Tasks
Protect the Force Project the Force Gain Information Dominance Shape the Battlespace Decisive Operations Sustain the Force	The Commander Drives Intelligence Intelligence Synchronization Split-Based Operations Tactical Tailoring Broadcast Dissemination	Direct Collect Analyze Disseminate Present Attack Protect

Vision Statements
<p>Leaders and Soldiers (Individual)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produce a joint information age warrior who is “Ready Now!” and who is able to perform across the spectrum of Army XXI missions and operations: technically, tactically, and as a leader. Produce combined arms commanders and warfighter staffs who understand U.S. intelligence capabilities—Army, joint, national—and who are proficient in the integrated, synchronized application of the non-lethal combat power afforded by those capabilities across the full range of Army XXI missions and operational settings. <p>MI Units (Collective)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enable MI units to regularly train to proficiency under realistic conditions so that they are “Ready Now!” Provide effective, integrated, and synchronized non-lethal combat power and support to the combined arms commander and the entire warfighting team across the full spectrum of Army XXI missions, operations, and environments. <p>Intelligence Center (Institutional)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yield a “Schoolhouse Without Walls” that is capable of and committed to seamless support of individual and collective intelligence readiness under realistic conditions across the force, be it in intelligence or combined arms units. Yield a “Schoolhouse Without Walls” that is current operationally, technically, and educationally and that is recognized Armywide as a center of excellence in the areas of distance learning, training simulation, and embedded system training.

Training Imperatives
Seamless Training Architecture Realism Proficiency

Core Competencies
Be an expert on friendly operations Be an expert on the Intelligence BOS Have technological proficiency appropriate to the leader’s or soldier’s job Be a proficient analyst Be a proficient maintainer Maintain proficiency in soldier skills Continuously seek to be a better leader

Goals - Intelligence Training XXI	
	Goal 1 - Construct training and a training environment which will produce Joint Information Age Warriors— Intelligence Leaders of the 21st century.
	Goal 2 - Develop an MI “Schoolhouse Without Walls” to facilitate seamless training between the school and the field.
	Goal 3 - Develop, field, and sustain flexible, realistic, and robust intelligence training materials, simulations, and devices.
	Goal 4 - Improve intelligence training provided to combined arms soldiers, staffs, and commanders.

Objectives	
1.1	Revise, update, and improve individual intelligence training strategies for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) to enable continuous professional development from service entry to retirement.
1.2	Develop and distribute training which will teach the MI Joint Information Age Warrior and Battle Captain how to conduct intelligence operations in a family of networks.
1.3	Develop a family of descriptive MI unit training strategies in support of Warfighter XXI.
1.4	Improve mission-based training at the Intelligence School by developing and implementing a structured family of exercises rooted in Army XXI doctrine, organization, and expected scenarios.
1.5	Develop and implement training which will teach intelligence leaders and soldiers to conduct threat analysis and to develop intelligence estimates based on the full spectrum of threats which Army XXI may face.
2.1	Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of a modern communications and information infrastructure that will enable the integration of field units into an interactive training development, doctrinal, and realistic training environment for the Army XXI intelligence force.
2.2	Re-engineer the Intelligence Center and School to support Army XXI training requirements.
2.3	Refine (and develop where they do not exist) the System Training Plan (STRAP) training strategies for MI flagship systems.
2.4	Develop individual TSPs for all common tasks for which MI is the proponent, in support of the Army Training Support Center’s (ATSC) effort to convert all Army common training to distance learning.
3.1	Articulate the requirement for and pursue development of an MI simulations architecture that will enable realistic, high fidelity training of the Army XXI intelligence force.
3.2	Review and revise the Intelligence Center’s Doctrinal Literature Program.
3.3	Develop TTP and related training products to support Force XXI intelligence training.
3.4	Develop a comprehensive, coherent, revitalized MI language sustainment training strategy in support of Army XXI.
4.1	Ensure Intelligence School instructors possess the required expertise to qualify as subject matter experts.
4.2	Improve intelligence training in combined arms training centers and activities.
4.3	Export standardized MI training to develop combined arms leaders who understand the employment and capabilities of the Intelligence BOS.